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Judicial Review, James Bradley Thayer,
and the "Reasonable Doubt" Test
By SANFORD BYRON GABIN*

While scholarly controversy over the role of the Supreme Court
in American government continues unabated, recent studies tend to
minimize and misunderstand, if not ignore or reject, the "reasonable
doubt" test as a valid standard of judicial review. Some observers even
consider it futile to search for standards by which to evaluate constituRaoul Berger is an exception. He suggests that
tional adjudication.'
the scope of judicial review was intended to be limited by the reasonable doubt test, that "the Framers refused to allocate a larger role to
the judges than annulment of laws that plainly went out of bounds."2
James Bradley Thayer would have roundly applauded Berger's
hypothesis. Professor of law at Harvard University from 1874 until his

death in 1902, Thayer published The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,' a major attempt to define the

proper scope of judicial review. The essay influenced such judges as
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis, Learned and Augustus
Hand, and Felix Frankfurter. Indeed, Frankfurter has stated that if

he had to choose only one piece of writing on American constitutional
*

Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, University of Houston at Clear Lake

City.
1. Archibald Cox, for example, believes the pursuit entails "an insoluble dilemma." Given "the need to perform the duty of judicial review without merely secondguessing the legislature in situations where both the wisdom and constitutionality of a
statute depend upon an appraisal of the same conflicting interests," Cox concludes that
there "is no rule by which a judge may know where to place the emphasis, nor any scale
by which the contemporary critic can measure the balance struck." A. Cox, THE
WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 4, 22-23,
106-07 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as Cox, THE WARREN COURT].

The Framers, Cox

flatly asserts, "provided no charter by which to measure the legitimate scope and nature
of constitutional adjudication." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 105 (1976).
2. R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT 343 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as BERGER].

3. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893) [hereinafter cited as Thayer, Origin and Scope].
[961]
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law it would be Thayer's article, "the most important single essay," which
he deemed "the great guide for judges and, therefore, the great guide
for understanding by non-judges of what the place of the judiciary is
in relation to constitutional questions." 4
Thayer's essay, nevertheless, has been largely misunderstood; recurrent attacks on Thayer's thesis have obscured more than clarified
his contribution to American constitutional thought. One continuing
criticism has been that Thayer's "rule of administration"-his prescription that the judicial abrogation of legislation should be confined to
cases in which the challenged statute is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt"-is "radically incompatible" with democratic theory,
which instead requires judicial policy-making even in those instances
when the alleged invalidity of a legislative act is manifestly uncertain.5
Critics also assert that Thayer's rule amounts to an abdication
of judicial review;" that the mere passage of an act by presumably
rational legislators would satisfy the reasonable doubt test;7 that the
distinction between clear and unclear violations of the Constitution
is fatuous;8 that Thayer's rule, taken seriously, would require judges
to employ a sanity test to determine the rationality of legislative
judgment;9 that the rule will not resolve the problem of conflicting constitutional values;1O that Thayer provides nourishment for the "preferred freedoms" doctrine;" and that Thayer inconsistently applied his
4. FELIX FRANFURTER REMINISCES 299-300 (H. Phillips ed. 1960).
See also
Frankfurter's tribute to Thayer in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 667 (1943),
and Holmes' letter to Thayer, quoted in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, AND FELIX FRANFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL, at xi (M. DeWolfe ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as ESSAYS ON MARSHALL].
5. C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 203-04 (1960) [hereinafter cited as BLACK].
6. Id. at 205-10. See also P. EIDELBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 312 n.4, 314 n.20 (1968) [hereinafter cited as EIDELBERG]; Harris,
Taking the Fifth, THE NEW YORKER, April 12, 1976, at 68.
7. BLACK, supra note 5, at 205. See also M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 16 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SHAPIRO]; H.
DEAN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY 114-15 (1966) [hereinafter cited as DEAN].
8. E. ROSTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
QUEST FOR LAW 30, 39, 179 (1962).
9. F. COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, in THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE--SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 44 (L. Cohen ed. 1960).
10. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 42-43 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH]; A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 177-81 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE COURT].

11. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 115. Shapiro labels the doctrine as one of "preferred
positions."
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own rule. 2 Confusion also reigns over the extent to which Thayer's
rule applies to state, as opposed to national, legislation.'" Analysis will
reveal, however, that Thayer's "rule of administration" is a logical,
workable, and probably necessary limitation on judicial judgment.
I.

Judicial Review:

Rationale and Scope in Early

American Constitutional Thought
Thayer, of course, did not write on a clean slate. Two centuries
earlier John Locke, 14 while advocating legislative supremacy within
natural law limitations, had unwittingly provided a persuasive rationale
for judicial review, which found its way into early American constitutional thought. Locke had argued for the impartial resolution of
private disputes in accordance with natural law by judges not party to
the dispute.' 5 Numerous delegates to the Philadelphia convention also
saw the need for impartial, independent judges capable of enforcing
constitutional limitations on those members of political institutions whose
very participation in law-making made them presumably biased parties
to the dispute and therefore unqualified to assess fairly the constitutionality of their own behavior.' 6 As Alexander Hamilton emphasized,
it could hardly "be expected that men who had infringed the Constitu12. BLACK, supra note 5, at 198-99, 214; DEAN, supra note 7, at 116-18; Thayer,
The Scope of Judicial Review, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60 (R. McClosky
ed. 1957).
13. BLACK, supra note 5, at 199, 214-15; DEAN, supra note 7, at 168.
14. "Locke dominates American political thought," Louis Hartz rightly observes,
"as no thinker anywhere dominates the political thought of a nation." L. HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 140 (1955).

15. Government, Locke often asserted, "is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases." J. LOCKE, Second Treatise
on Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 10 (E. Barker ed. 1962).

See also id. at 9,

52, 73, 76, 80, 84. The fact that Locke confined popular, majoritarian judgment and
redress of alleged governmental violations of natural law to cases having no "judicature
on earth to decide" them, and "no appeal to a judge on earth" (id. at 99, 142) surely
belies Willmoore Kendall's claim that "those seeking ammunition with which to defend
America's peculiar institution will look in vain for it in the Second Treatise." W.
KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY-RULE 99 (1965).
16. Refusal by the convention to associate the judiciary with the executive in a
council of revision empowered to review the wisdom and the constitutionality of
proposed legislation was grounded in the conviction that judicial impartiality required
separation of the judicial function from the legislative process. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97-98, 108 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
RECORDS OF 1787 CONVENTION]; 2 id. at 75, 79, 82, 298. See also BERGER, supra note 2,
at 67-68, 183-86; EIDELBERG, supra note 6, at 205-07.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

would be disposed to repair the
tion in the character of legislators,
17
judges.'
of
character
the
in
breach
Nevertheless, while the Framers may have approved judicial review but condemned judicial policy-making,' 8 the convention failed to
distinguish satisfactorily between the two functions. It thereby left the
permissible scope of judicial judgment inadequately defined. This omission prompted Robert Yates, the antifederalist from New York who
feared that judicial review would become judicial supremacy, to advocate the other extreme, legislative supremacy. In his Letters of
Brutus, Yates argued that judicial independence freed the judiciary to
manipulate an often ambiguous Constitution in conformity with its own
policy preferences; far from securing impartiality, such independence
permitted, even encouraged, biased judicial decisions that would usurp
the legislative function of Congress.'" Hamilton, however, believed judicial independence would have the opposite effect; separation of the
judiciary from the other two branches of government and from the
people would free the judiciary to interpret the Constitution impartially.
Chief Justice John Marshall, whose unpersuasive justification of
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison2 ° is generally interpreted as
"thoroughly Hamiltonian,"'" in fact, overlooked Hamilton's impartiality
argument. 22 Furthermore, the chief justice cited hypothetical examples of clear constitutional violations before voiding part of an enactment that was, in fact, not clearly repugnant to the Constitution, thus
earning a scathing rebuke from Judge John Bannister Gibson.23 Un17. Tim FEDERALIST No. 81, at 412 (Dutton ed. 1948) (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter
cited as THE FEDERALIST]. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 407.
18. See 1 RECORDS OF 1787 CONVENTION, supra note 16, at 97-98, 108; 2 id. at 73-

76, 80. The author is aware of no Framer who defended judicial policy-making.
19. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (C. Kenyon ed. 1966).

20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 66 (1957). See E. CORWIN, THE
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63 (1963).
22. In the Virginia ratifying convention Marshall seems to have recognized the
"impartiality" argument 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION

OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 552,

559 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).

Ronald

Dworkin, who considers the "impartiality" argument implicit in Marshall's justification
in Marbury, thinks that "the principle that no man should be judge in his own cause" is
"so fundamental a part of the idea of legality that John Marshall would have been
entitled to disregard it only if the Constitution had expressly denied judicial review."
Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 4,
1972, at 31-32 [hereinafter cited as Dworkin].
23. Gibson's defense of legislative supremacy in his dissenting opinion in Eakin v.
Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawl. 330 (Pa. 1825), is not itself impeccable. Moreover, his critique

Fall 19761

THE "REASONABLE DOUBT" TEST

like Marshall in Marbury, Hamilton developed a concept of judicial review that combined a convincing rationale for the power with a plausible, potentially workable definition of its legitimate scope. The possibility of judicial error, even bias, forced Hamilton to concede that judicial fallibility required a limitation on the exercise of judicial discretion. 24 Invalidation of legislation on the mere "pretence of a repugnancy" to the Constitution, Hamilton admitted, would amount to the
substitution of judicial policy-making for "the constitutional intentions
of the legislature. '25 If, he added, judges "should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be
the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The
observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be
no judges distinct from that body."26 Violation of the permissible
scope of judicial review, Hamilton confessed, would destroy its rationale. But how does one distinguish "judgment" from "will" or from "arbitrary discretion"? 27 Hamilton answered that the judicial duty to void
legislation arises only if "an irreconcilable variance"2 exists between
the Constitution and the challenged enactment, implying that in doubtful cases judges should withhold their veto. Hamilton did not, however, elaborate upon the problems implicit in "the faithful performance
'29
of so arduous a duty."
John Marshall attempted such an elaboration in McCulloch v.
Maryland. 0 The first issue in that case, whether Congress had the
power to incorporate a national bank, involved interpretation of a
constitutional ambiguity; the Constitution did not expressly confer or
deny that power, and the necessary and proper clause permitted conflicting interpretations, one supporting and the other precluding the necessity
of the bank. Why, then, did Marshall uphold the power of Congress to
establish the bank? Edward S. Corwin's explanation attributed Marshall's decision solely to the exercise of judicial will:
The truth is that the major premise of most of the great decisions
of the Supreme Court is a concealed bias of some sort-a highly
laudable bias, perhaps, yet a bias. For example, the question at
of Marshall's justification, while impressive, overlooks what Marshall himself ignored in
Marbury, the impartiality argument.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 17, at 398-99 (A. Hamilton).
25. Id. at 398.
26. Id. at 398-99.
27. ld. at 401.
28. Id. at 397.
29. Id. at 399.
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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issue in McCullough v. Maryland [sic] was the meaning of the
phrase "necessary and proper": did it mean "absolutely necessary"
or "convenient"? Marshall said it meant "convenient." But why,
except because he was a nationalist? Now, however, suppose he
had decided that the phrase in question had borne the other meaning. His particularistic bias would have resulted in the overthrow
of the will of the federal legislature. Or to put the whole matter in
a sentence: the real question at issue when the validity of an act of
Congress is challenged before the Supreme Court is not whether
the fundamental Constitution shall give way to an act of Congress,
but whether Congress' interpretation of the fundamental Constitution shall prevail or whether it shall yield to that of another human,
and therefore presumably fallible, institution,-a bench of judges. 31
Corwin also insisted that Marshall's famous statement in McCulloch
-- "we must never forget, that it is a constitutionwe are expounding . . .
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs" 32-implied the need for judicial
law-making, for the statesmanlike exercise of judicial will. But
McCulloch does not verify that assumption; in that case Marshall clearly
indicated that it was the duty of the political branches, not the judiciary,
to adapt the "great outlines" of the Constitution to the changing needs
of society, and, consequently, that it was the duty of the judiciary to
s3
uphold constitutionally permissible legislative will.
In deciding, therefore, whether Congress could establish a national
bank, Marshall observed that the enumerated powers of Congress 34
were obviously undefined and hence susceptible of broad construction.
Moreover, because the Constitution did not specifically prohibit the
creation of a corporation by Congress or "enumerate the means by
which the powers it confers may be executed," the Court had to inquire
"how far such means may be employed." 35
Only necessary and proper means could be used, but this phrase
had a variety of connotations, including both the restrictive interpretation of absolutely necessary or indispensable and the permissive interpretation of "convenient." Confronted with such exegetical difficulties, Marshall noted that by enacting such legislation the Congress and
president thought the means necessary. Because "[i]t would require no
ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that [their judgment] was a bold
31. Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress, 4 U.
MicH. L. Rnv. 616, 625 (1906) (emphasis in original).
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407-15 (emphasis in original).
33.

Id. at 416.

34. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408-09.
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and plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no countenance," 36
Marshall concluded that the Court should defer to reasonable legislative interpretation of the necessary and proper clause:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the
welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the
intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could
not be done by confiding [sic] the choice of means to such narrow
limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which
might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This
provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which government
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the
properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt
to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen
at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided
for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not
be used, but those alone without which the power given would be
nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise3 7 its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.

Constitutional creativity, then, was a pblitical, not a judicial, prerogative; "to inquire into the degree of [the law's] necessity, would be to
pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread
on legislative ground." Marshall specifically indicated that the Court
38
should disclaim any such pretensions.
The scope of judicial review, as contemplated by Hamilton's irreconcilable variance test and as exemplified by Marshall's treatment of
the first issue in McCulloch, is probably tantamount to the scope of
judicial review as measured by the reasonable doubt test. Such a
limitation on judicial review makes its exercise compatible with three

essential components of early American constitutional thought:

the

rationale for judicial review which rested on the need for impartial and

therefore independent judges to resolve constitutional disputes; the nature of the Constitution, often silent or ambiguous, and therefore often
permitting differing rational interpretations; and the realistic admis-

sion that even impartial judges are not infallible.
Confining the scope of judicial review to the veto of clearly unconstitutional acts also permits reconciliation of conflicting strains in
36.

Id. at 402.

37. Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 423.
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early American constitutional thought. For if judicial review was
regarded by its defenders as a means for checking unconstitutional
legislative and executive power, then the "irreconcilable variance" test
may well have been regarded by Hamilton and others as a means for
checking what Yates, and later Gibson, feared would (or had) become
unbridled judicial power. If this is so, then the reasonable doubt test
may be viewed as a vital mechanism for maintaining a middle ground
between legislative and executive supremacy on one hand, and judicial
supremacy on the other.
II.

James Bradley Thayer and the Dimensions of
Judicial Judgment: The "Reasonable Doubt"
Test Versus "Independent Judgment"

It remained for James Bradley Thayer to rationalize further the
legitimate dimensions of judicial judgment. Thayer recognized that
although judicial review served a legitimate and useful function it was
neither the first nor necessarily the last determination of constitutionality; the political branches always had an original constitutional duty
to make a preliminary and possibly final judgment of the constitutionality of their own behavior. The constitutional convention, by rejecting the creation of a council of revision, had precluded the judiciary
from immediate review of legislation. By requiring all members of the
political branches to support the Constitution, the oath provision of
article VI imposed on them an obligation to make a preliminary determination of constitutionality; this preliminary judgment might be final
because judicial review might not be invoked, and even if it were invoked, it could not always erase or legitimize the prior impact of legislation. Therefore, if one accepts Thayer's rationale, a legislative judgment is constitutionally entitled to judicial respect. To veto a reasonable legislative enactment, handed down by presumably rational men
constitutionally entitled to what Thayer called an "independent judgment," on the basis of any judicial standard other than the reasonable
doubt test not only would have serious practical consequences for the
fate of legislation, but also would amount to the substitution of one independent judgment for another. Thayer's conclusion, therefore, was
that the reasonable doubt test implied a partial, not full and complete,
power of review.
Not surprisingly, Thayer, like most commentators, overlooked the
impartiality argument for judicial review. He agreed with Gibson
that Marshall's justification for judicial review in Marbury was wholly
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inadequate 0 and assumed that Marshall had simply followed Hamilton.
Thayer argued, moreover, that Marshall's decision begged the key issue, whether the constitutionality of an act of Congress can be brought
before a given tribunal;40 this fact alone should have warned Thayer
that the rationale of Marbury and Hamilton's doctrine of judicial review were not interchangeable.
Despite Thayer's failure to distinguish between Marshall's and
Hamilton's positions and thus to acknowledge the latter's more persuasive rationale, Thayer did approve of judicial review 41 and attempted
to delineate its legitimate scope. Constitutional adjudication, in his
view, did not consist merely of
construing two writings and comparing one with another, as two
contracts or two statutes are construed and compared when they
are said to conflict; of declaring the true meaning of each, and, if
they are opposed to each other, of carrying into effect the constitution as being of superior obligation,-an ordinary
and humble judi4

cial duty, as the courts sometimes describe it. 2

This approach to the judicial task easily produced
the wrong kind of disregard of legislative considerations; not merely
in refusing to let them directly operate as grounds of judgment, but
in refusing to consider them at all. Instead of taking them into
account and allowing for them as furnishing possible grounds of
legislative action, there takes place a pedantic and academic treatment of the texts of the constitution and the laws. And so we miss
that combination of a lawyer's rigor with a stateman's breadth
of view which should be found
in dealing with this class of ques43
tions in constitutional law.
Because a constitution is a significantly different kind of document
from a private contract or will, constitutional interpretation was not an
ordinary judicial duty for a constitution need not-in fact, often does
not-have a true meaning. Thayer hypothesized:
If it be said [that the construction of a constitution is ultimately] the construction of a writing; that this sort of question is
39. Thayer called Gibson's dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub "the ablest discussion of the question which I have ever seen, not excepting the judgment of Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, which, as I venture to think, has been overpraised." Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 130 n.1.
40. Thayer, John Marshall, in ESSAYS ON MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 77, 80.
Thayer expressed the same opinion in his 1893 essay: "The reasoning was simple and
narrow. Such was Hamilton's method in the Federalist . . . . As the matter was put,
the conclusions were necessary." Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 138-39. See
also id. at 130, where Thayer asserted that the constitutional text did not "necessarily"
imply judicial review.
41. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 140.
42. Id. at 138.
43. Id.
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always a court's question, and that it cannot well be admitted that
there should be two legal constructions of the same instrument; that
there is a right way and wrong way of construing it, and only one
right way; and that it is ultimately for the court to say what the right
way is,-this suggestion appears,
44 at first sight, to have much force.
But it really begs the question.
According to Thayer, then, when the problem is deciding whether a
governmental act is legal, the key issue the court needs to decide is
not the meaning of any provision of the Constitution but rather whether
the act may be sustained as a valid exercise of power.
It cannot do this as a mere matter of course,-merely because it
is concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is unconstitutional. That is precisely the significance of the rule of administration that the courts lay down. It can only disregard the
Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,-so clear that
it is not open to rational question. That is the standard of duty
to which the courts bring legislative Acts; that is the test which they
apply,-not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but
their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will
seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably
not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and
judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon
the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range
of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.
45

Too often, Thayer lamented, judges asked the wrong question.
As early as 1884 Thayer had formulated the "precise question" that
a court faces regarding the constitutionality of legislation:
Has the legislative department kept within a reasonable interpretation of its power? Can their action reasonably be thought constitutional? Does the question of its conformity to the Constitution
fairly admit of two opinions? If it does admit of two opinions, then
the legislature is not to be deprived of its choice between them;
for this choice is a part of that mass of legislative functions which
belong to it and not to the court. 46
Instead of posing the question in these terms, judges usually asked: Is
the law constitutional? This erroneous approach often led judges to substitute their own policy preferences for an exacting scrutiny of the chal44. Id. at 150. But see BLACK, supra note 5, at 204.
45. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 144 (emphasis added).
46. Thayer, Constitutionality of Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court, 38
THE NATiON 314-15 (1884).
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lenged statute in question in order to determine whether the legislature
abused its authority and transgressed the limits of reasonable interpretation.
But even Thayer's rule of administration permitted limited judicial
involvement in political matters. After all, the reasonable doubt test
itself gave judges a certain measure of discretion to interfere in political
affairs. Thayer thus firmly broke with Gibson, who had denied the
judiciary the power to declare laws unconstitutional.4 If judicial review existed at all, Gibson had argued, the constitutionality of challenged legislation "would depend, not on the greatness of the supposed
discrepancy with the constitution, but on the existence of any discrepancy at all." 48 For Gibson there was no middle ground between legislative supremacy and judicial supremacy, no appropriate rule of administration for confining judicial judgment; either a judge gave the
Constitution his independent interpretation of its true meaning, even
in unclear cases, or he exercised no power of review at all. Thayer
disagreed; whereas Gibson had insisted that judicial review was a dangerous and unnecessary check on legislative power, Thayer insisted that
the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality will always be the courts.49
Thayer explained his view of what really took place in adopting the
theory of constitutional law: "[W]e introduced for the first time into the
conduct of government through its great departments a judicial sanction,
. . -not full and complete, but partial. The judges were allowed,
indirectly and in a degree, the power to revise the action of other departments and to pronounce it null."50 The power was indirect because it operated only, if ever, after passage of legislation; it was incomplete because the rule of administration circumscribed its scope.
Had a broader reviewing power been intended, Thayer argued,
the judiciary would have been allowed to hand down advisory opinions
prior to the enactment of legislation. The Philadelphia convention,
however, declined to equate the Court with a council of revision. The
absence of an immediate judicial judgment of an act's constitutionality
reinforced the legislature's duty, imposed by the oath provision of
article VI of the Constitution, to make that original and possibly final
judgment. By the time constitutional questions reach the judiciary, the
47. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 145.
48. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawl. 330, 352 (Pa. 1825).
49. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 152.

50. Id. (emphasis added). See also id. at 136, where Thayer noted that judicial
review was not regarded by the Framers "as the chief protection against legislative violation of the constitution."
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legislative decision might have accomplished results of the "profoundest importance" throughout the country. Thayer concluded that a
power as momentous as the legislature's primary authority to interpret
entitles the actual determinations of the legislature "to a corresponding
respect; and this not on mere grounds of courtesy or conventional respect, but on very solid and significant grounds of policy and law." 1
Thayer had effectively reinstated the relevance of the oath pro-

vision. Unlike Marshall, who had unsuccessfully used it to justify judi6ial review, and unlike Gibson, who had successfully used the same
provision to undermine Marshall's argument,5 2 Thayer employed the

oath provision neither to justify nor to challenge judicial review, but
rather to aid the judiciary in defining its legitimate scope. Illustrating
the relationship between the reasonable doubt test and independent

judicial judgment, Thayer remarked that in McCulloch Marshall sought
"to establish the court's own opinion of the constitutionality of the legis-

lation establishing the United States Bank."53 Not only had Marshall
deferred to a reasonable congressional interpretation of the ambiguous
term "necessary," he had also imported the Court's independent judgment of the issue into the decision. Thayer recognized that it "is very
often true . . . that where the court is sustaining an Act, and finds it

to be constitutional in its own opinion, it is fit that this should be
said. .

. ."I'

Such a declaration, an independent judgment in favor

of constitutionality, is all that the case called for; it disposed of the
matter.

But, Thayer continued, there were "many cases where the

judges sustain an Act because they are in doubt about it; where they
are not giving their own opinion that it is constitutional, but are merely
leaving untouched a determination of the legislature ....

.55

51. Id. at 135-37. See also J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 9 n.1 (1908) [hereinafter
cited as THAYR, LEGAL ESSAYS], where he quotes with approval the Massachusetts court
in Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 524, 533 (1809): The legislature "must, in the first
instance, but not exclusively, be the judge of its powers, or it could not act." Charles
Black, however, denies that the oath legislators take to support the Constitution implies
any necessary judicial respect for legislative judgment. See BLACK, supra note 5, at 214.
52. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 145. Chief Justice Marshall's reliance on the oath provision, binding federal judges to support the Constitution, furnished
to Gibson "an argument equally plausible against the right of the judiciary" for article
six imposes the same oath on "Senators and Representatives . . . and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States." U.S. CONST. art. VI. The oath provision might
obligate each of those officers to support the Constitution as he alone construes it.
53. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 151 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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In such cases judges did not import their own opinion of the true meaning of the Constitution into their decision; instead, "the strict meaning of
is merely this,their words, when they hold an Act constitutional,
56
not unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
An independent judgment in favor of constitutionality was, therefore, sufficient but not necessary to sustain legislation; for an act stood,
even if at variance with the judge's independent judgment, unless it
also failed the reasonable doubt test. It followed, then, that an individual legislative judgment against constitutionality would not necessarily
compel the same judgment by the same individual in a judicial capacity.
This seeming paradox, central to a correct understanding of Thayer's
rule of administration, had been endorsed by Judge Cooley, whom
Thayer approvingly paraphrased:
[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure
as being, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently
placed on the bench, when this measure, having been passed by
the legislature in spite of his opposition, comes before him judicially, may there find it his duty, although he5 7has in no degree
changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional.
Although the legislator, exercising an independent judgment, had deemed
the act unconstitutional, as a judge he could not allow that opinion to
be controlling; for if a reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality
exists, the act must be sustained. Thayer therefore understandably
conceded that much legislation "which is harmful and unconstitutional
may take effect without any capacity in the courts to prevent it, since
their whole power is a judicial one."5 " This result was possible for
the same reason our system of criminal justice permitted a defendant,
in fact guilty, to be acquitted: his guilt might not be established beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The rule of administration, while often affirmed by distinguished
jurists, had also been attacked. As early as 1817, Jeremiah Mason had
denied the propriety of the rule of administration in his argument of
the Dartmouth College case59 before the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. The rule, he insisted, really required the court to surrender its jurisdiction because a reasonable doubt could ordinarily be
made out in favor of most legislation. Accordingly, courts ought to review legislation with no more than ordinary deliberation, with the un56. Id.

57. Id. at 144.

Judge Cooley's remark is quoted in J.

THAYER,

172-75 (1895).
58. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 137-38 (emphasis added).
59. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111 (1817).
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biased dictate of their understanding-in effect, with an independent
judgment instead of the "erroneous" reasonable doubt test. Daniel
Webster, Thayer noted, had also denied the validity of the rule. In
1829, arguing the Charles River Bridge case ° before the Massachusetts courts, Webster urged that all cases involve some doubt and suggested that the passage of any act by the majority of a legislature would
normally create a reasonable doubt in its favor. Because, however,
legislators often were irresponsible, indeed, often depended on the
courts to resolve difficult constitutional disputes, Webster thought
judges had a duty to exercise an independent judgment.6"
Thayer demurred to these "ingenious" attempts to turn courts into
councils for answering "legislative conundrums. ' 62 Legislatures, to be
sure, were often disloyal to their trust, but "virtue, sense, and competent knowledge are always to be attributed to that body. '6 3 The
question, Thayer explained,
is not merely what persons may rationally do who are such as we
often see, in point of fact, in our legislative bodies, persons untaught it may be, indocile, thoughtless, reckless, incompetent,-but
what those other persons, competent, well-instructed, sagacious, attentive, intent only on public ends, fit to represent a self-governing
people, such as our theory of government assumes to be carrying
on our public affairs,-what such persons 64may reasonably think or
do, what is the permissible view for them.
Even if legislators are inept or corrupt, the constitutional duty of the
court remains untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protect the people
by undertaking a function not its own. 65
Thayer's rule of administration, while limiting the scope of judicial
judgment, did not imply the abdication of judicial review. Judgment
still had to be exercised, and the judicial veto would still be properly
invoked when the legislature clearly misinterpreted the scope of its
power. Judicial determination of whether a reasonable doubt existed
was, therefore, not automatically made by the mere passage of legislation by presumably rational men; for rational men could-and some60. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344 (1829).
61. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 145-46.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 149.
64. Id. Thayer explained: "The reasonable doubt, then, of which our judges speak
is that reasonable doubt which lingers in the mind of a competent and duly instructed
person who has carefully applied his faculties to the question. The rationally permissible
opinion of which we have been talking is the opinion reasonably allowable to such a
person as this." Id.
65. Thayer, John Marshall,in EssAYS ON MARsHALL, supra note 4, at 88.
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times did-act irrationally."" The question was not whether legislators
were in fact rational, but whether their judgment in a particular case
could have been based on a rational and thus permissible interpretation
of the Constitution. This judicial judgment, moreover, turned not only
on what legislators in fact believed when they passed a particular act,
but also on what they might rationally have believed, as shown during
the course of litigation by 67the quality of arguments for and against the
constitutionality of the act.
The fact that reasonable differences of opinion existed over the
correct construction of the Constitution often meant that many constitutional issues properly became jury questions-issues on which reasonable men, exercising an independent judgment, could justifiably decide
either way. Application of Thayer's rule of administration meant that
in such cases a judge had no more power to substitute his independent
judgment for that of the legislature than he had to revise a jury verdict
when the issue was a jury question. Thayer's definition of the legitimate scope of judicial judgment therefore enabled the results urged by
Locke, Yates, and Gibson to prevail in large measure. This was true
not because, as they had argued, the political branches and ultimately
the people were properly the exclusive judge of the constitutionality
of their own behavior, but rather because the invalidity of legislative
judgment could not always be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
even by impartial judges. The rationale behind this limitation on judicial review, sometimes permitting unconstitutional legislation to go unchecked by the courts, was essentially the same as that permitting the
acquittal of nine guilty men so that one innocent man would not be
convicted: it would be just as dangerous for impartial but fallible
judges to give the Constitution a true meaning when it had no clear
one as for an impartial but fallible jury to convict a criminal defendant
when a reasonable doubt still existed; even the utmost impartiality
could not create sufficient certainty to dispel a reasonable doubt.
It followed, then, that the impartiality of judges did not justify a
judicial, instead of political, choice between constitutionally permissible
alternative policies. Indeed, the impartiality argument justified only
66. As Alexander M. Bickel has rightly observed, "[it does not take a lunatic
legislature to enact measures that are irrational." BICKEL, LEAST DANGERous BRANCH,
supra note 10, at 39. See Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 134, for examples
cited by Thayer of clearly unconstitutional acts.
"For our purposes we
67. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
must assume that, if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation, it
actually did exist when the statute now under consideration was passed." Id. at 132.
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the final construction of the Constitution by independent judges for the
purpose of keeping political judgment within constitutional bounds.
Because the exercise of choice between constitutionally permissible
alternatives was exclusively a political function, judicial review required
application of the reasonable doubt test, not just as a necessary aid in
performing the judicial function impartially but also as a necessary aid
in reducing the possibility of judicial policy-making.
The justification of judicial review therefore delimited its legitimate scope, and the justification of a broader scope-for example, independent judgment-required a different rationale, one justifying not
merely judicial review but judicial performance of a political function.
Impartiality alone as a justification for judicial policy-making was insufficient; two further conditions, both categorically rejected by the
Framers, were needed: first, the belief that impartiality was a necessary aid in fashioning "good" or "wise" public policy and hence the belief that impartial judges were capable of making better public policy
than were legislators; and second, the preference for "wise" public
policy made by politically independent judges over the public policy
made by legislators. Impartiality justified judicial review, subject to
Thayer's rule of administration, but removal from the political process
did not justify substitution of politically independent judicial judgment
for the constitutional outcome of the political process itself.
Accordingly, Thayer gave no support to the "preferred freedoms"
doctrine, 8 for his rule precluded the substitution of independent judicial judgment for rational, and possibly "unwise," legislative choice or
accomodation between conflicting constitutional values when neither
was clearly constitutionally preferred.69 But the charge that Thayer's
rule does not solve the problem of conflicting constitutional values is
simply not true; rather the rule does not solve the problem as some
of Thayer's critics would prefer it be solved. If, for example, a constitutional power allegedly conflicted with a constitutional right or re68. See Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 149. Thayer, referring to such
constitutional freedoms as the prohibition against ex post facto laws and "the provisions
about double jeopardy, or giving evidence against one's self, or attainder, or jury trial,"
clearly indicates that the reasonable doubt test applies to all constitutional freedoms
alike. There is not, the author believes, the slightest suggestion in Thayer's writings supporting the doctrine of "preferred freedoms."

69. Curiously, Learned Hand's approach to the problem of conflicting constitutional values seems to require judges to inquire whether the legislative accommodation was
impartially reached. See L. HAND, THE BiLL OF RIGHTS 65-66 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as HAND, BiLL OF RicHTs]. See also L HAND, THE SPmrr OF LMERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSEs OF LEARNED HAND 211-12 (I. Dillard ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as HAND,
SP=RT OF LBERTY].

Fall 19761

THE "REASONABLE DOUBT" TEST

straint on that power, or if two constitutionally protected fights allegedly conflicted, application of Thayer's rule would require a judicial determination of whether one constitutional value clearly prevailed over
the other. If, by virtue of the reasonable doubt test, a power clearly
prevailed over a right, or a right over a power, or one right over another, then that prevalence resolved the issued. Otherwise, reasonable
legislative judgment would be sustained, and that resolved the issue
too; for nothing but the plainest constitutional provisions of restraint,
Thayer insisted, would justify judicial disregard of a reasonable legis70
lative judgment.
To the extent, of course, that the reasonable doubt test yielded
a clear constitutional preference for, say, rights involving access to the
political process over freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, judicial
review, even limited by Thayer's rule, would enhance the status of such
constitutionally preferred freedoms. But Thayer never endorsed the
exercise of an independent judicial judgment intentionally aimed at enlarging particular constitutional rights at the expense of rational legislative judgment. Instead, he had enormous respect for the political
process and strongly believed that judicial policy-making, in whatever
7
cause, seriously threatened the effective functioning of that process. 1
While courts surely had a duty to protect the constitutional integrity of
the political process, no political theories based merely on an independent judgment about the nature of the nation's system of government
would justify judicial tampering with the system or with its constitutional outcome, even in the name of wisdom or justice.
Despite his strong and repeated warnings against judicial invalidation of legislation based only on a court's independent judgment,
Thayer nevertheless insisted on an important exception to his rule of
administration. Whereas courts were obliged to apply the reasonable
doubt test when reviewing acts of coordinate branches of government,
they might be required to exercise an independent judgment when reviewing acts of subordinate governmental bodies. Thayer, like Gibson,
believed that the supremacy clause required the federal courts to main70. THAYEa, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 51, at 30 n.2 (emphasis added). See also
Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 148, where Thayer clearly indicates that the
reasonable doubt test applies to a potential conflict between power and right: 'The
judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border of reasonable legislative
action, the boundary beyond which the taxing power, the power of eminent domain,
police power, and legislative power in general, cannot go without violating the prohibitions of the constitution or crossing the line of its grants."
71. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 155-56; Thayer, John Marshall, in
ESSAYS ON MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 87-88.
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tain the paramount authority of the national government. Thayer reasoned:
If a State legislature passes -a law which is impeached in the due
course of litigation before the national courts, as being in conflict
with the supreme law of the land, those courts may have to ask
themselves a question different from that which would be appli72
cable if the enactments were those of a co-ordinate department.
When, however, the issue relates to what is admittedly not a national
power, then Thayer urged a different approach:
[W]hoever construes a State constitution, whether the State or national judiciary, must allow to that legislature the full range of
rational construction. But when the question is whether State
action be or be not conformable to the paramount constitution, the
supreme law of the land, we have a different matter in hand.
Fundamentally, it involves the allotment of power between the two
governments,-where the line is to be drawn. True, the judiciary
is still debating whether a legislature has transgressed its limit; but
the departments are not co-ordinate, and the limit is at a different
point. The judiciary now speaks as representing a paramount constitution and government, whose duty it is, in all its departments,
to allow to that constitution nothing less than its just and true interpretation; and7 3 having fixed this, to guard it against any inroads
from without.
Whether Thayer intended federal courts to exercise an independent judgment, instead of applying the reasonable doubt test, when reviewing all state legislation allegedly conflicting with the federal Constitution has been a continuing source of puzzlement. Indeed, some
of his critics, believing that Thayer did intend the application of an independent judicial judgment to all state legislation, have charged him
with inconsistency for approving decisions in which federal courts in
fact applied the reasonable doubt test to determine whether state legislation conflicted with the Constitution.7 4 Thayer's own language, however, seems to limit the application of an independent judicial judgment
to state action allegedly in conflict with the constitutional exercise of
national power. Intended to protect national power against state encroachment, the independent judgment standard was, it appears, not
meant by Thayer to be applied to state legislation in the absence of
7
a clash with national power. 1
72. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 154.
73. Id. at 154-55 (emphasis added).
74. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
75. Thayer's qualifying language supports this interpretation; so does his own
application of the "rule of administration." See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), where Justice Frankfurter rebuked the Court for exercising what he thought was an independent judicial
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Thayer could therefore quite consistently approve Marshall's use
of a precursor of the reasonable doubt test in the Dartmouth College
case, 76 as well as Justice Bushrod Washington's reference to the same
7
Both cases held
test in his dissenting opinion in Ogden v. Saunders.1
unconstitutional state action that did not conflict with national power.
Thayer's approval of the decision in the Minnesota Rate Cases"8 also
becomes understandable. The constitutional issue there, as Thayer
noted, was "whether a statute providing for a commission to regulate
railroad charges, which excluded the parties from access to the courts
for an ultimate judicial revision of the action of the commission" violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 As in
Dartmouth College and Ogden, no state conflict with national power
existed. Accordingly, Thayer applied the reasonable doubt test, not
an independent judgment, and concluded, like the Court, that the
Minnesota statute was clearly unconstitutional:
[There is often that ultimate question, which was vindicated for
the judges in a recent highly important case [the Minnesota Rate
Cases] in the Supreme Court of the United States, viz., that of the
reasonableness of a legislature's exercise of its most undoubted
powers; of the permissible limit of those powers. If a legislature
undertakes to exert the taxing power, that of eminent domain, or
any part of that vast, unclassified residue of legislative authority
which is called, not always intelligently, the police power, this
action must not degenerate into an irrational excess, so as to become, in reality, something different and forbidden,-e.g., the depriving [of] people of their property without due process of law; and
judgment to strike down state legislation in the absence of a clash with national power.
And Frankfurter expressly invoked the reasonable doubt test in his attempt to save the
legislation. Id. at 661-62, 666-67. He also asserted that "since the First Amendment
has been read into the Fourteenth, our problem is precisely the same as it would be
if we had before us an Act of Congress for the District of Columbia." Id. at 650.
Justice Frankfurter went on to defend the application of the reasonable doubt test because the state act did not conflict with the exercise of national power: "Moreover,
it is to be borne in mind that in a question like this we are not passing on the proper
distribution of political power as between the states and the central government. We
are not discharging the basic function of this Court as the mediator of powers within
the federal system. To strike down a law like this is to deny a power to all government."
Id. at 667. See also Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), overruled by Barnette, in which he also rejected
independent judicial judgment.
76. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Thayer invoked Marshall's statement that "in
no doubtful case would [the Court] pronounce a legislative Act to be contrary to the
Constitution." Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 145.
77. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827). Thayer invoked Justice Washington's
use of the reasonable doubt test. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 142 n.1.
78. Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
79. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 3, at 148 n.1.
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whether it does so or not, must be determined by the judges. But
in such cases it is always to be remembered that the judicial question is a secondary one. The legislature in determining what shall
be done, what it is reasonable to do, does not divide its duty with
the judges, nor must it conform to their conception of what is prudent or reasonable legislation. The judicial function is merely that
of fixing the outside border of reasonable legislative action, the
boundary beyond which the taxing power, the power of eminent
domain, police power, and legislative power in general, cannot go
without violating the prohibitions of the constitution or crossing the
line of its grants.8 0

Thayer's commentaries on the constitutional relationship between
state power and Congress' commerce power provide further evidence

that he confined the independent judgment standard to state action
allegedly colliding with the exercise of national power. Thayer believed
that Congress and not the judiciary was the primary regulator of this
relationship. "It is Congress and not the courts, to whom is intrusted the
regulation of that portion of commerce which is interstate, foreign, and
with the Indian tribes;" and therefore, Thayer concluded, "primarily,
it would appear to be the office of the Federal legislature, and not of
the Federal courts, to supervise and moderate the action of the local

legislatures, where it touches these parts of commerce.""'
Thus,
Thayer endorsed the decision in the leading case of Cooley v. Board
of Wardens,82 in which the Court upheld a state pilotage fee against
the charge that it unconstitutionally conflicted with the national commerce power. Speaking for the Court, Justice Benjamin Curtis reasoned that subjects national in scope, requiring uniform legislation,
must be regulated by Congress, but that subjects local in character, not
demanding uniform legislation, could be regulated by the states until
80. Id. at 148. Thayer, in approving the Minnesota Rate Cases, insisted on
application of the reasonable doubt test, which more than preserves the "presumption of
constitutionality" in favor of challenged legislation. See also id. at 148 n.3, which
further confirms that Thayer rejected arbitrary judicial definitions of "reasonableness." It
should also be noted that Chief Justice Waite, considered by many to have been a
paragon of judicial restraint because of his opinion in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1877), elsewhere expressed views on the substantive limits of state power to regulate
public utilities, views remarkably similar to those expressed by Thayer in the quoted
passage. See Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886), in which Chief
Justice Waite said: "[I]t is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation
is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is
not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the
State cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward;
neither can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation, or without due process of law."
81. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 51, at 36 n.1.
82. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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and unless Congress, by acting on the same subject, displaced state
law. In Cooley, Congress had determined through legislation that the
subject did not require uniform, national regulation and had manifested
a clear intent to leave regulation of the subject to the states. No conflict existed, then, between state action and congressional exercise of the
commerce power. Justice Curtis' opinion, Thayer thought, correctly
implied that Congress, not the courts, was the primary judge of the need
for uniform, national legislation:
Now the question whether or not a given subject admits of
only one uniform system or plan of regulation is primarily a legislative question, not a judicial one. For it involves a consideration
of what, on practical grounds, is expedient, possible, or desirable;
• . . It is not in the language itself of the [commerce] clause . . . .
or in any necessary construction of it, that any requirement of uniformity is found, in any case whatever. That can only be declared
necessary, in any given case, as being the determination of someone's practical judgment. The question, then, appears to be a
legislative one; it is for Congress and not for the courts,.-except,
indeed, in the sense that the courts may control a legislative decision, so83 far as to keep it within the bounds of reason, of rational
opinion.
Thayer believed, then, that if Congress expressly determined, as in
Cooley, that uniformity was not required and that state legislation
should stand, courts could not review state legislation on the issue of
uniformity. Indeed, courts were not free to review state legislation on
that issue even if Congress had not acted at all. Thayer, therefore, disapproved the Court's decision in Leisy v. Hardin,8 4 where Chief Justice
Melville Fuller, speaking for the Court, struck down a state law prohibiting the sale in the original package of liquors imported from another state. The Court held that the need for uniformity, in the absence of congressional action, barred state regulation of the subject.
Thayer disagreed, contending that congressional silence should not be
construed as an excuse for judicial policy-making. To the question of
83.

THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS,

supra note 51, at 36 n.1. Thayer's exception in the

last sentence of this passage should not be interpreted to mean that courts, applying the
reasonable doubt test, can overturn congressional judgment on the issue of uniformity,
for Thayer had earlier correctly indicated that they cannot. Instead, the reasonable
doubt test would properly invalidate legislation if Congress, for example, under the guise
of "uniformly regulating commerce," clearly violated constitutionally protected rights.
See also BLACK, supra note 5, at 205-07. Black presents many examples of far-fetched
but possible legislative violations of the Constitution accomplished by labelling constitutionally proscribed legislation as exercises of expressly granted powers. He might also
have listed the commerce power as providing a pretense for the exertion of unconstitutional power.
84. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
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who should say whether one uniform rule is required, Thayer replied:

"[T]hat question is for Congress, and the State regulation 'must stand
until Congress shall see fit to alter it.'

"5

He conceded that Congress

might very likely be dilatory or negligent in enacting legislation on such
issues but concluded that it was one consequence of the powers granted
by article II of the Constitution. Congressional silence, then, permitted
the application of neither an independent judgment nor the reasonable
doubt test to state legislation on the issue of uniformity. Instead, state
legislation could only be invalidated, Thayer emphasized, if it were so

clearly unconstitutional for reasons other than the need for uniformity
6
that no consent of Congress could save it.

The independent judgment test seems, therefore, not intended by
Thayer to be applied to all state action.

Even its apparent limitation

to state action allegedly in conflict with the constitutional exercise of
national power, however, is not justified; for Thayer's insistence on
employing independent judicial judgment in the service of national
supremacy, in order to vindicate national power at the expense of state

power when genuine conflict is doubtful, really amounts to advocacy
of a particular political theory in violation of his own warning. After
all, although the supremacy clause, without the aid of independent

judgment, clearly yields supremacy for constitutional national law over
conflicting state law, this fact does not imply a broader scope for judicial

judgment, entailing a special judicial duty to protect national power
over state power when conflict does not clearly exist. Nor was the in85. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 51, at 36 n.l. Interestingly, Justice
Frankfurter, who accepted Thayer's exception to the "rule of administration" when
federalism was involved (see note 77 supra), departed from Thayer's restriction on that
exception. Whereas Thayer limited the exercise of an independent judicial judgment to
cases in which state action allegedly collided with the exercise of national power and
precluded any judicial judgment on the need for uniformity when Congress had not acted
under its commerce power, Frankfurter, as well as a majority of the modem Court, felt
free to exercise independent judgment to strike down state interference with the national
commerce power in the absence of congressional regulation. Justice Black, however,
adhered strictly to Thayer's view on this subject. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
86. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 51, at 36 n.l. In the same passage Thayer
repeated his insistence that "the courts should abstain from interference, except in cases
so clear that the legislature cannot legitimately supersede their determinations; for the
fact that the legislature may do this, in any given case, shows plainly that the question is
legislative, and not judicial." Thayer added, significantly: "It is also to be remembered
that much in State action, which may not be reached by the courts under the present
head [commerce], may yet be controlled by them under other parts of the Constitution,
as in such cases as Crandall v. Nevada, and Corfield v. Coryell." Id. (citations omitted).
One must assume that Thayer intended the reasonable doubt test to apply to judicial
review of state action allegedly in conflict with these "other parts of the Constitution."
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dependent judgment test even needed to protect national power.
Thayer himself had correctly recognized that Congress had primary responsibility for regulating state action touching on Congress' commerce
power. Rejecting the need for independent judicial judgment in the
service of that power, he observed that
the great thing which the makers of the Constitution had in view,
as to this subject [commerce], was to secure power and control to
a single hand, the general government, the common representative
among the States;
of all, instead of leaving it divided and scattered
87
and that this object is clearly accomplished.
If, as Thayer believed, Congress was perfectly able to regulate commerce and thereby control state interference with that subject, then
Congress was also able to frame legislation so as clearly to preclude
even the slightest state encroachment on the exercise of national power.
It should be recognized that standards do not prescribe solutions
in individual cases, and Thayer's rule, like all guideposts, is not selfapplying. As Thayer himself admitted, the judicial function allows the
judiciary only a secondary role in the political conduct of government.
Even circumscribed by the rule of administration, judges, like criminal
juries, might differ over what constitutes a reasonable doubt; the possibilities, the stuff of which reasonable doubts are made, do not always
strike all men, however reasonable, alike. But even under Thayer's
rule of administration the freedom and the burden of decision-making
remain, although that freedom is narrowed. Thayer sought to reduce
the scope of judicial freedom without diminishing the judicial duty and
burden of judging.
I.

Footnote Four and "Preferred Freedoms"

Thayer's rule of administration has been honored in the breach
as much as it has been faithfully followed. In fact, barely two years
after publication of his 1893 article, the Supreme Court, as if in direct
defiance of Thayer's admonition to confine judicial judgment to the
reasonable doubt test, launched into a new protection of property
rights. During this period the Court often invalidated the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers, usually on the ground that Congress was
attempting to regulate a subject exclusively reserved to the states.
The Court also struck down the exercise of states' power, usually on
the ground that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
87. THAYER, LWAL ESSAYS, supra note 51, at 36 n.1.
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Soon after the Court's abrupt withdrawal from the exercise of independent judgment in the service of property rights, the foundations
were laid for another reign of judicial supremacy in the service of new
preferred freedoms. The origin of this new rationale for judicial activism was Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's famous footnote four to his opinion for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 88 Written
during the Court's transition from judicial supremacy in the service of
property rights to a similar role in the service of non-property rights,
the opinion explicitly advocated that the reasonable doubt test should
henceforth be applied to legislative regulation of the economy. Upholding congressional prohibition of the shipment of "filled milk" in
interstate commerce on the ground that Congress could reasonably
have believed such milk was injurious to health and a fraud on the
public, Chief Justice Stone emphasized that regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions would generally be assumed
to rest upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience
of the legislators. Then came the famous footnote:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v.
California,283 U.S. 359, 369-370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the
dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 71-8-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences with
political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra 369;
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes,
J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition
of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 484, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon,
supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice against discrete
88. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Compare
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina v.

Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n. 2, and cases cited.89

Without even attempting to explain why property rights deserved
less judicial protection than non-property rights,90 Justice Stone asserted that special judicial scrutiny-ultimately involving a reversal of
the traditional presumption of constitutionality9 ' and thereby permitting
the exercise of independent judicial judgment-might be required
when First Amendment freedoms are allegedly infringed, when the

rights of racial, religious, or national minorities are allegedly violated,
or when the political process itself is allegedly impeded. Laying claim
to judicial supremacy in behalf of what was later dubbed "preferred
freedoms,

'92

the footnote relied on such venerable and imposing au-

thority as certain opinions of Justices Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo, and the then chief justice, Charles Evans Hughes.

The prob-

lem, however, is that these opinions, while affirming the importance
of First Amendment freedoms, the rights of minorities, and an unim-

peded political process, lend little support to Justice Stone's suggestion
that legislation that allegedly adversely affects rights in these areas
might legitimately be subject to a reversal of the presumption of con89. Id. at 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
90. As Learned Hand remarked in 1946: "Just why property itself was not a
'personal right' nobody took the time to explain." HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note
69, at 156. See also Frankfurter, John Marshall and the JudicialFunction, in ESSAYS ON
MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 159-60. For a thoughtful critique of "the doubtful distinction between economic and civil rights," see McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CONSTITTION 158-86 (P. Kurland ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as McCloskey].
91. Robert H. Jackson, soon to join the Court, observed in 1941: 'The presumption of validity which attaches in general to legislative acts is frankly reversed in the case
of interferences with free speech and free assembly, and for a perfectly cogent reason.
Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in economic wisdom is uncertain can be redressed by
the processes of the ballot box or the pressures of opinion. But when the channels of
opinion and of peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political correctives
can no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is threatened at its most vital
point. In that event the Court, by intervening, restores the processes of democratic
government; it does not disrupt them." R. JACKSON, Tim STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 285 (1941) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as JACKSON].
92. Chief Justice Stone introduced this expression in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584, 600, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting); Justice Douglas invoked it for the
majority in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). For a bitter attack on
the idea of preferred freedoms, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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stitutionality; nor do these opinions imply that non-property rights are
more important than property rights.
The first paragraph of footnote four refers to Stromberg v. California93 and Lovell v. Griffin,94 both opinions for the Court written by
Chief Justice Hughes that involve no reversal of the presumption of
constitutionality and provide no basis for the preferred freedoms
doctrine. Stromberg simply struck down a state law prohibiting the display of a red flag "as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized government" on the ground that it violated freedom of speech as
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; the statute could clearly be
construed, the Court held, as embracing conduct that the state could
not constitutionally prohibit, i.e., peaceful and orderly opposition to
government by constitutionally protected means.95 Lovell invalidated
a city ordinance barring the distribution of any kind of literature without a permit as clearly a prior restraint on freedom of speech and of
the press; Near v. Minnesota96 was controlling precedent. Both Stromberg and Lovell involved legislation the Court found clearly unconstitutional "on its face" and Stromberg stressed that enjoyment of First
Amendment freedoms was a prerequisite for participation in the political process; but neither decision reversed the presumption of constitutionality or indicated that First Amendment freedoms held preferred
constitutional status. 97
In the second paragraph of footnote four, the references to opinions condemning unconstitutional restrictions on the political process
likewise give no support to Justice Stone's inferences. In fact, Justice
Holmes' opinion in Nixon v. Herndon,98 in which a unanimous Court
struck down a Texas statute forbidding Negroes the right to vote in the
Democratic Party primary election, twice invoked the reasonable doubt
test as the controlling judicial standard. 99 Relying on Herndon,
Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court in Nixon v. Condon'00 invalidated a similar resolution by the State Executive Committee of the Texas
Democratic Party acting under authority of statute. Neither opinion
93. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
94. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
95. 283 U.S. at 369.
96. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
97. See Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE LJ.
571, 580 n.28 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Braden], in which the author calls Stromberg
and Lovell "only vaguely relevant" to paragraph one of footnote four.
98. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
99. Id. at 540-41.
100. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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accorded preferred status to rights relating to the political process. 1 '
Even Justice Brandeis' famous concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Holmes, in Whitney v. California,0 2 in which the Court upheld a conviction for advocating unlawful force in violation of a state criminal
syndicalism act, disavows rather than supports the notion of preferred
freedoms. "The power of the courts to strike down an offending law,"
Justice Brandeis said, "is no less when the interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental personal rights of free speech and assembly."' 0 Despite Justice Brandeis' strong affirmation that First
Amendment freedoms are crucial to the political process, he did not
suggest that judicial power to protect these rights was any greater than
judicial power to protect property rights. Indeed, both Justices Brandeis and Holmes upheld Miss Whitney's conviction on the basis of the
reasonable doubt test. Both thought that a trial court or jury could reasonably have found that her activity constituted a "clear and present
refused to
danger" to the security of the state, and both accordingly
04
exercise independent judgment to overrule the verdict.
Justice Stone's references in paragraph three of footnote four to
opinions invalidating legislation prejudicial to minorities suffer from the
same defects. Justice McReynolds' opinion for the Court in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 0 5 holding an Oregon law requiring compulsory public school education unconstitutional as a violation of the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the education of children under their control, neither reverses the presumption of constitutionality nor embodies
any suggestion of preferred freedoms. Furthermore, the opinion relies
heavily on Meyer v. Nebraska,"6 Stone's other reference, in which
Justice McReynolds' opinion for the Court twice invoked the reasonable
doubt test to strike down a state law forbidding the teaching of any
modem language other than English to any pupil who had not passed
the eighth grade. Knowledge by a child of some language other than
English was not "so clearly harmful,"' 0 7 Justice MoReynolds held, as to
101. Justice Stone did not rely on Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-29 (1937), where the latter asserted that a theory of preferred
freedoms was mandated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Significantly, Justice Cardozo did not support reversing the presumption of constitutionality; rather, he believed that the reasonable doubt test controlled judicial judgment.
102. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
103. Id. at 374.
104. Id. at 379-.
105. 268 U.S.510 (1925).

106. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
107. Id. at 403.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

justify the plain interference with the right of a foreign language teacher
to teach and the right of parents to engage him to instruct their children.1 8 It should also be noted that Justice Holmes, joined by Justice
Sutherland, dissented in Meyer on the express ground that, in their
opinion, the statute was saved by the reasonable doubt test.' 9 Appealing to the test three times, Justice Holmes was "not prepared to say that
it is unreasonable" to provide that children shall hear and speak only
English at school, especially if there were areas of the state where they
would hear only a foreign language at home. While Justice Holmes
appreciated the objection to the law, it nevertheless presented to him "a
0
question upon which men reasonably might differ.""1
Paragraph three of footnote four closes with reference to the authority of John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,"' where the chief
justice repudiated the suggestion that every argument that would sustain the right of the national government to tax banks chartered by the
states would equally sustain state taxation of national instrumentalities.
The analogy did not stand up, as Marshall explained:
The people of all the States have created the general government,
and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation. The
people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented
in Congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power.
When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their
constituents . . . . But, when a State taxes the operations of the
government of the United States, it acts upon institutions created,
not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim
no control. It acts upon the measures of a government created by
others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common
with themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and
always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and
the action of a part on the whole-between the laws of a government declared to be supreme, and those of a government which,
when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme." 2
Marshall's statement was thought by some students of the Court to be
Justice Stone's most impressive support for the Carolene Products ideas
contained in both paragraphs two and three." 3 Justice Stone inferred
108. Id. at 402.
109. Id. at 403.
110. Id. at 402.
111. 17 U.S. (4Wheat.) 316 (1819).
112. Id. at 435-36.
113. See, e.g., Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REv. 385, 403-04
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Mason, Judicial Activism]; Lusky, Minority Rights and the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Lusky]; Letter from
Justice Stone to Chief Justice Hughes, April 19, 1938, quoted in A. MASON, THE
SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 155 (1962).
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that the Court might have a special duty to correct the outcome of an
impeded political process, as in the case of state taxation of national
instrumentalities, when political restraints on state action were not
available," 4 and furthermore that the Court might have a similar duty
to purify the political process so as to minimize dependence on a judicial remedy.": 5
Louis Lusky has commented on the last two paragraphs:
[They embody] a frank recognition that the Court feels a special responsibility for the protection of the "political processes," because, unless some non-political agency intervenes, interferences
with the corrective mechanism may well perpetuate themselves.
The Court thus performs an important part in the maintenance of
the basic conditions of just legislation. By preserving the hope that
bad laws can and will be changed, the Court preserves the basis
for the technique of political obligation, minimizing extra-legal opposition to the government by making it unnecessary. . . . Where
the regular corrective processes are interfered with, the Court must
remove the interference; where the dislike of minorities renders
those processes ineffective to accomplish their underlying purpose
of holding out a real hope that unwise laws will be changed, the
Court itself must step in.""
Marshall's dictum in McCulloch, however, implied nothing of the sort;
this observation was simply his own justification of the concept of national supremacy contained in the supremacy clause. An argument for
the supremacy of the constitutional outcome of the national political
process over the conflicting outcome of any state's political process, it
implied nothing about the purity of either political process; still less did
it suggest a special judicial duty to revise the constitutional outcome
of either political process in the service of a more desirable outcome
or a special judicial duty to remove constitutionally imposed or constitutionally permitted antidemocratic impediments to the pure functioning
of either political process. The issue in McCulloch was which political
114. At the end of paragraph three, Chief Justice Stone cited his own opinion for
the Court in South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), in
which the Court struck down state legislation affecting interstate commerce on the
ground that "when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally
upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely
some interest within the state." Id. at 184-85 n.2. Yet political restraint-action by
Congress-was available; that it was not (yet) forthcoming does not necessarily justify a
judicial "remedy." See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945);
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 n.2 (1940); Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416 (1938).
115. See, e.g., Mason, Judicial Activism, supra note 113, at 394; Cox, THE WAREN
COURT, supra note 1, at 94-95.
116. Lusky, supra note 113, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
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process, however pure or impure, democratic or antidemocratic, was
constitutionally entitled to prevail. That the national political process
emerged triumphant was, of course, in part a function of Marshall's belief that the action of the state of Maryland clearly violated the supremacy clause.
Scantily supported by the references Justice Stone invoked, footnote four additionally suffers from serious logical deficiencies. Paragraphs two and three suggest that because a "dependence on the
people" through the political process is, as James Madison put it, the
"primary control" on government, 17 the Court, as an auxiliary check,
therefore has a special duty to undo the undesirable outcome of an impure political process. This implies that the Court, despite the constitutionally intended nature of the political process, should rewrite the
Constitution. The political process argument, then, proves either too
little or too much: too little because it begs the question why the Court
should exercise its independent judgment to determine the character
of the political process and of its outcome when the Constitution prescribes its own procedures for change; and too much because the political process argument alone might well justify the judicial exclusion
from the American political system of such antimajoritarian, yet clearly
constitutional, institutions as the United States Senate, the electoral college, even the Supreme Court itself. To the extent that First Amendment freedoms are protected constitutionally, their judicial enforcement does not depend on the political process argument any more than
did Chief Justice Marshall's invalidation of the Maryland tax in McCulloch. Moreover, to the extent that freedoms are not protected
constitutionally, the justification for judicial expansion or contraction
of their scope depends on whether the Court is empowered to rewrite
the Constitution in the service of judicially desired constitutional change.
Finally, the corollary suggestion in paragraphs two and three, that
the Court has a special duty to enable particular "discrete and insular"
minorities, vulnerable to majoritarian prejudice, to undo or attempt to
undo undesirable legislation through the political process, involves
similar logical difficulties. Why, for example, only religious, national,
and racial minorities? Why not economic minority groups, too?,,
Why should any minority that loses in the political process, but that has
not had any constitutional rights clearly infringed, enjoy an appeal to
117.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, supra note 17, at 264 (J. Madison).

118. See, e.g., Braden, supra note 97, at 581; Murphy, Deeds Under a Doctrine:
Civil Liberties in the 1863 Term, 59 AM. PoL. Sci. Rav. 64, 72-74 (1965).
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the judicial process either to expand those constitutional rights that
affect participation in the political process or to reverse the outcome
of that process? Plainly, whatever the nature of the political process,

however unimpeded, minorities inevitably lose, in the sense of not prevailing politically.

Given, therefore, a political system in which, for

example, all members of the body politic could exert equal influence on
the decision-making processes, would the losing minorities still deserve

special protection beyond judicial enforcement of clear constitutional
guarantees?
Perhaps so, defenders of footnote four suggest; for they argue that

for the sake of peaceful societal change, instead of violent revolution,
all minorities must be able to believe that the political process truly permits the repeal of "undesirable" legislation and that, consequently, judicial review exercised for this purpose becomes a surrogate for revolu-

tion."'

To recognize, however, that judicial enforcement of Bill of

Rights limitations on government would be a valuable aid in helping

to domesticate revolution is not to concede a broad scope for judicial
judgment. 120 Nor does it follow that the judiciary has a special duty
to undo the allegedly undesirable, albeit constitutional, outcome of the
political process simply because a disgruntled minority fought the good
battle and lost. For what of the potentially even more disgruntled ma119. See, e.g., Lusky, supra note 113, at 20-21; Mason, Understandingthe Warren
Court: Judicial Self-Restraint and Judicial Duty, 81 PoL. ScI. Q. 523, 560-61 (1966).
120. Opposing legislative supremacy in Virginia, Jefferson called for "the proper
remedy; which is a convention to fix the constitution, . . . to bind up the several branches
of government by certain laws, which, when they transgress, their acts shall become
nullities; to render unnecessary an appeal to the people, or in other words a rebellion, on
every infraction of their rights, on the peril that their acquiescence shall be construed
into an intention to surrender those rights .... ." 8 THE WarrINGs OF THoMAs
JEFFERSON 371-72 (H. Washington ed. 1856).
Often interpreted as an argument for
judicial review, this passage nowhere mentions that institutional innovation. During the
struggle over ratification of the Constitution Jefferson did, of course, alert Madison to
an argument in favor of a Bill of Rights which had "great weight" with Jefferson,
namely, "the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." But even this
endorsement of judicial review is hedged by Jefferson's next sentence: "This is a body,
which if rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits great
confidence for their learning and integrity." Letter from Jefferson to James Madison,
March 15, 1789, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1958). The
qualifier seems much more consistent with Jefferson's later defense of "departmental
construction" of the Constitution than with support of judicial review. Furthermore,
when Madison, apparently persuaded by Jefferson concerning the need for a Bill of
Rights, proposed the Bill of Rights -amendments to the House of Representatives in 1789,
Madison noted that judicial review would be limited to the protection of "rights expressly
stipulated for . . . by the declaration of rights." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Gales &
Seaton eds. 1789) (emphasis added).
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jority that also fought the good battle in the political process only to have
its hard-won victory, obtained without any clear violation of the constitutional rights of the minority, upset in the judicial process? Such a majority, or as Dahl would have it, a transiently united group of minorities,
might well have more cause than the defeated minority, now victorious
in the judicial process, to be impatient with the likelihood of getting
peaceful change through either the political or the judicial processes.
Indeed, why should the Court have any power to invalidate so-called
undesirable legislation over which reasonable men regularly and justifiably disagree?
At bottom, then, footnote four contained suggestions lacking in
authority and logic and thoroughly incompatible with the traditional
scope of judicial review as articulated by James Bradley Thayer.
Justice Stone, as we look upon him with hindsight, was breaking new
legal ground and intimating the use of new constitutional doctrine. Not
surprisingly, the influence of the footnote was quickly felt by both
Court and country. Barely two years after it was written, footnote four
divided the Court in Minersville v. Gobitis,'2 ' in which Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court with only Justice Stone dissenting, upheld state power to require the flag salute of children in public schools
in violation of the religious scruples of Jehovah's Witnesses. Three
years later, when the Court reversed itself in West Virginia v. Barnette,"22
' Justice Frankfurter was the dissenter and Stone, now chief justice, joined in Justice Jackson's majority opinion.
Justices Stone and Jackson, urging the unconstitutionality of the
flag salute requirement, eschewed the political process argument so
prominent in footnote four. The argument was irrelevant, they
thought, for participation of minorities in the political process did not
thereby render their constitutional rights vulnerable to the will of the
majority; however democratic the political process might be, judicially
enforced constitutional limitations would prevail. Accordingly, Justices
Stone and Jackson relied strongly on other facets of footnote four: the
fact that Jehovah's Witnesses were not only a minority but also a small
religious minority; their belief that First Amendment freedoms, which
Jackson expressly accorded preferred constitutional status, were infringed; and the Court's willingness to exercise independent judgment
in behalf of preferred freedoms. Justice Frankfurter, however, found
the political process argument quite relevant; it was for him the core
121. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
122. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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of footnote four. But precisely because the Jehovah's Witnesses were
not excluded from the political process and were free to oppose the
flag salute requirement, Justice Frankfurter thought the political process argument unavailing. Like Justices Stone and Jackson, then, Justice Frankfurter apparently would have voted to strike down unconstitutional obstructions of the political process; but unlike his colleagues, Justice Frankfurter rejected the constitutional relevance of the
Jehovah's Witnesses' status as a small minority and refused to exercise
an independent judgment in behalf of preferred freedoms. That the
Jehovah's Witnesses were a religious group was, of course, constitutionally relevant to Justice Frankfurter, but the only issue for him was
whether, according to the reasonable doubt test, the flag salute requirement violated their free exercise of religion.
What really divided Justices Stone and Frankfurter in the first flag
salute case, was not, then, the political process argument but the legitimate scope of judicial review. The political process argument was inapplicable, Justice Frankfurter urged, because the remedial channels
of the democratic process were open and unobstructed and all the effective means of inducing political changes were left free from interference. 12 3 Justice Stone agreed, but he was not persuaded that the
Court "should refrain from passing upon the legislative judgment"
simply because the political process was unimpeded. Such restraint
seemed to Justice Stone to be "no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular
will.' 2 4 Justice Stone concluded that the flag salute requirement
2 5
operated to repress "the religious freedom of small minorities.'
Twice rejecting the independent judgment test, in his opinion for
the Court and again in a letter to Justice Stone, 126 Justice Frankfurter
instead applied the reasonable doubt test. "The mere possession of
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society," he held, "does not relieve the citizen from the discharge
of political responsibilities."'2 7 Surely, Frankfurter thought, the legislative end-the promotion of good citizenship and patriotism-was
legitimate; the crucial question was whether the means, however un123.
124.
125.
126.

310 U.S. at 599-600.
Id. at 605-07.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 596, 598; Letter from Frankfurter to Stone, May 27, 1940, reprintedin A.
SECURrrY THROUGH FREEDOM 218 (1955) [hereinafter cited as MASON, SECURITY

MASON,
THROUGH FREEDOM].

127.

310 U.S. at 594-95.
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wise, were irrational. The issue, he concluded, was highly debatable,
for the means for attaining the legislative end were "still so uncertain
and so unauthenticated by science as to preclude us from putting the
widely prevalent belief in flag-saluting beyond the pale of legislative
power.' 128 The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses, Justice Frankfurter believed, is not for our independent judgment.. Even
were we convinced of the folly of such a measure, such belief would
be no proof of its unconstitutionality. 2 9
Any doubt over the real rift between Justices Stone and Frankfurter in Gobitis disappeared when Justice Jackson, speaking for the
Court in the second flag salute case, 30 explicitly affirmed the implications of Justice Stone's earlier dissent. Again the political process
argument did not divide the justices; rather Justice Jackson's categorical insistence on the Court's special duty to exercise independent judgment in the service of preferred freedoms provoked Justice Frankfurter's strident dissent. Rejecting the relevance of the political process argument, Justice Jackson pointed out that the "very purpose of
a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy .. . ."1' These rights, he added, may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no election. Certain
of these rights, moreover, deserved greater judicial protection than
others:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may
well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to
impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press,
of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully
32
protect.'
Since "the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs," changed conditions had thrust
upon the justices necessary reliance upon their own judgment in enforcing such non-property rights as First Amendment freedoms.Y33 How128. Id. at 598.
129. Id. at 595, 598. See also id. at 599, where Frankfurter refused to strike down
legislation "[e]xcept where the transgression of personal liberty is too plain for argument."
130. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
131. Id. at 638.
132. Id. at 639.
133. Id. at 638-40. See also id. at 654-55.
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ever doubtful the alleged violation of First Amendment freedoms, and
however much reasonable men might differ over the issue, the presumption of constitutionality in favor of legislation allegedly infringing those
freedoms was, as Jackson wrote shortly before joining the Court, "frankly
reversed."'1 34 Justice Jackson declared in Barnette that the justices had
a corresponding if unwelcome duty, earned not by any marked competence but imposed by force of their commissions, to exercise an independent judgment on behalf of religious freedom. 33
To Justice Frankfurter, neither history nor changed conditions regarding increased governmental regulation of property rights, nor especially the force of his commission, implied any such duty. Inveighing
against the Court's rejection of the reasonable doubt test in favor of
the exercise of independent judgment, he lamented that he knew of
no standard 'other than the reasonable doubt test that the Court could
justifiably apply. 3 ' The only issue properly before the court, he urged,
was its opinion whether legislators could in reason have enacted such a
law. 137 But the Court had demanded more than a rational basis for
the flag salute requirement; by exercising its own independent judgment the Court had denied state legislatures their independent judgment between alternative rational means for attaining a legitimate
legislative end.
Not only had the Court distorted the intended constitutional relationship between religious freedom and political obligation; it had also
distorted, Justice Frankfurter argued, the intended constitutional relationship between majority rule and minority rights. By attaching unwarranted significance to the fact that Jehovah's Witnesses were a small
minority, the Court had, in effect, lost sight of the truism that the right
to participate in the political process did not imply the right to prevail;
that while the majority is limited by the right of minorities peacefully
to oppose, the majority has a right to prevail so long as its choice is
not clearly unconstitutional. Because the Jehovah's Witnesses were
not barred access to the political process, and all channels of affirmative
free expression remained open to them, their status as a losing minority
in the political process was, Justice Frankfurter insisted, constitutionally
irrelevant; their claim could rest only on a clear violation of their religious freedom. But as no inroads were made upon the actual exercise
134.
135.
136.
137.

JACKSON, supra note 91, at 285.
319 U.S. at 640.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 647.
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of religion by the minority, Justice Frankfurter concluded that "to deny
the political power of the majority to enact laws concerned with civil
matters, simply because they may offend the consciences of a minority
really means that the consciences of a minority are more sacred and
more enshrined in the Constitution than the consciences of a majority."' 3 Justice Frankfurter ended his long dissent in Barnette by quoting extensively from James Bradley Thayer, whose thesis, Frankfurter
observed, was "as wise as any that I knew in analyzing what is really
involved when the theory of this Court's function is put to the test of
practice."1 9
Justice Frankfurter's plea for judicial restraint-for application of
the reasonable doubt test-went unheeded by the Court in Barnette.
With the casualness of a footnote, as Justice Frankfurter once regretted, 140 Justice Stone in the Carolene Products case had suggested a
rationale for judicial supremacy-for the exercise of independent judicial judgment in the service of preferred freedoms, the rights of certain
minorities, and of a purified political process. Adopted by the Court
in Justice Jackson's opinion in the second flag salute case, that rationale
would flower, even flourish, under the Warren Court.
IV.

A.

The Warren Court and the Exercise of
"Independent Judgment" in Behalf of
"Preferred Freedoms"

Racial Equality

The era of the Warren Court opened with a decision later considered by the chief justice as his Court's second most important, Brown
v. Board of Education.'4 ' Appropriately enough, Justice Jackson,
138. Id. at 662.
139. Id. at 667.
140. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Stone, too, may have regretted the footnote. See Letter from
Stone to Irving Brant, August 25, 1945, quoted in Mason, Judicial Activism, supra note
113, at 425. Jackson, once a leading defender of the footnote, also expressed doubts. See
R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 57-58, 8082 (1955).
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In a news conference held on July 5, 1968, Warren
acclaimed the reapportionment decisions of 1962 and 1964-Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964)-as his Court's major contribution to the solution of the problems confronting
America. Next in importance he cited Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and third on his list was Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which
extended the right to counsel in state courts to all indigent defendants in serious criminal
cases. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 1, col. 8.
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author of the opinion of the Court a decade earlier in the second flag
salute case, set the tone for the Warren Court's approach to school desegregation. During oral argument over Brown in 1953, Justice Jackson addressed Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin, arguing for
the United States as amicus in support of the Negro plaintiffs: "I suppose
that realistically the reason this case is here is that action couldn't be
obtained from Congress. 1 42 Indeed, action could not be obtained from
Congress. Although explicitly empowered under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the
provisions of the amendment, including the equal protection clause,
Congress had failed to outlaw segregated public schools. Had Congress so acted, its legislation would surely have been constitutional under
the reasonable doubt test even in the face of a judicial determination
that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was inconclusive with
respect to its intended effect on segregated public schools. Unless
the amendment were intended to exclude such congressional enforcement, an independent congressional judgment that segregated schools
violated the equal protection clause would not be unreasonable.
The Court would not invalidate segregated public schools under
the reasonable doubt test since the intended effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment on segregated schools was, by the admission of a unanimous Court, inconclusive. Exhaustive examination of the relevant
sources did cast some light, Chief Justice Warren wrote, but "not
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they
are inconclusive.
...
14
Yet this judicial finding, at odds with Justice Black's later statements that he joined the opinion because the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments conclusively
barred racial segregation, 144 did not deter the Court; its unanimity was
perhaps best explained by Wallace Mendelson's suggestion that "no
Justice was prepared to face history with the albatross of racialism upon
him.' 145 Past history for the Warren Court proved, as Edmond Cahn
has observed, "an element far too ambiguous to be considered very important, much less decisive.' 46 Accordingly, the Warren Court refused to "turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
142. 22 U.S.L.W. 3161 (1953).
143. 347 U.S. at 489.
144. See Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663, 670 n.7 (1966) (Black, J.,dissenting).
145. W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT
76 (1961).
146. Cahn, A Dangerous Myth in the School Segregation Cases, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV.

150, 152 (1955).
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adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.' 147 Instead, the chief justice insisted, the Court "must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined
if segregation in the public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws."' 48
As early as Brown, then, Chief Justice Warren had adopted a creative approach to constitutional adjudication. This approach, which involved the exercise of independent judicial judgment in the service of
constitutional change, was candidly acknowledged by the chief justice
a decade later when he joined with Justice Douglas in Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland. 49 Arguing that the
equal protection clause guaranteed equal access to places of public accommodation, Justice Goldberg urged that "even if the historical evidence were not as convincing as I believe it to be, the logic of Brown
.... ,based as it was on the fundamental principle of constitutional
interpretation proclaimed by Chief Justice Marshall" in McCulloch,
required the Court to update the Fourteenth Amendment. 150 Although
disavowing any judicial duty to rewrite or amend the Constitution,''
Justice Goldberg nevertheless implored the Court in Bell to "assess the
status of places of public accommodation 'in the light of' their 'full
development and . . . present place' in the life of American citizens,"' 5 just as the Court in Brown had considered public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American life.
B. Voting Rights
Two years after Bell the Brown approach was again explicitly affirmed, this time by Justice Douglas in Harper v. Virginia, 53 in which
the Court struck down a state poll tax for violating the equal protection
clause. Speaking for five other members of the Court, including the
chief justice, Justice Douglas invoked Brown as leading precedent for
judicial updating of the Fourteenth Amendment. '4 Like Justice
Goldberg in Bell, Justice Douglas denied any judicial duty to rewrite
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

347 U.S. at 492, referring to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 492-93.
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 316.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Id. at 669-70.

Fall 1976l

THE "REASONABLE DOUBT" TEST

or amend the Constitution. "Our conclusion," he insisted, "is founded
not on what we think governmental policy should be, but on what the
Equal Protection Clause requires."' 155 But what the equal protection
clause required depended on the Court's independent judgment:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic
notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process
to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the
limits of fundamental rights. . . . Notions of what constitutes
equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change.' 561
Justice Black dissented. He accused the majority of exceeding its limited power to interpret the original meaning of the equal protection
clause by giving that clause a new meaning that the Court believed represented a better governmental policy. 15 7 The majority had consulted
its own notions, Justice Black charged, on the untenable ground "that
to save the country from the original Constitution the Court must have
constant power to renew it and keep it abreast of this Court's more
enlightening theories of what is best for our society.' 58 Repudiating
judicial creativity in the service of desirable constitutional change, he
claimed that when a political theory embodied in the Constitution becomes outdated, a majority of the Court is not only without constitutional power but is far less qualified to choose a new constitutional political theory than the electorate proceeding in the manner provided for
by article V. 15 9
Justice Black, of course, shared the Court's antagonism toward
making payment of a tax a prerequisite to voting, 60 but, like the other
dissenters, Justices Harlan and Stewart, he could not conclude that a
state poll tax, however unwise, was clearly irrational. The basis for
such a tax-the state's desire to collect revenue and its belief that
voters who pay a poll tax will be interested in furthering the state's welfare when they vote-was not unreasonable. Certainly it is rational
to believe, Justice Black thought, that people may be more likely to
pay taxes if payment is a prerequisite to voting.' 6 ' Justice Harlan
agreed and in his dissent, joined by Justice Stewart, he pointed out that
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 670.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 674.
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"[p]roperty qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional part of
our political structure" and that "it is only by fiat that it can be said,
especially in the context of American history, that there can be no
rational debate as to their advisability."16 Yet the Court had attributed
to the equal protection clause the unsupportable proposition that equal
protection simply means indiscriminate equality. 163 To be sure, Justice
Harlan admitted, property and poll tax qualifications are not in accord
with current egalitarian notions of how a modem democracy should be
organized. But while it was entirely fitting that legislatures should
modify the law to reflect changes in popular attitudes, it was wrong,
Justice Harlan urged, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines
"popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare
all others to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of
choice by reasonably minded people acting through the political process."

164

Justice Harlan, who succeeded Justice Jackson to the Court and
did not participate in the Brown decision of 1954, refused to endorse
the creative approach taken in Harper, but he did not endorse Justice
Black's support of Brown either. Instead he averred that the equal
protection clause, as applied to state discrimination based on race, may
embody a particular value in addition to rationality; its historical intent
might give racial equality a special status.16 Justice Harlan reluctantly
admitted state discrimination based on race might not be subject to the
reasonable doubt test, which he praised in Harper because that "standard reduces to a minimum the likelihood that the federal judiciary will
judge state policies in terms of the individual notions and predilections
of its own members,"' 6
The demise of the reasonable doubt test under the Warren Court
began, therefore, with Brown, in which rationality as the measure of
equal protection went the way of history. The Court implicitly recognized what Alexander M. Bickel has called the obvious omission in the
reasonable doubt test---"namely, the question, not whether a legislative
choice is rational . . . but whether it is good."'67

Thus the Court

called for an additional judgment, and if the political processes failed
to make the "good" choice, the Warren Court was often ready to sub162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

684.
682.
686.
663, 682 n.3.
681-82.

BICKEL, POLITICS AND

THE COURT,

supra note 10, at 179 (emphasis added).
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stitute its "independent judgment." When the national political process failed to desegregate the public schools in the District of Columbia
and refused to enforce desegregation in twenty-one states' 68 the Court
intervened. In the District of Columbia case, the Court attempted to
legitimize, as footnote four had suggested, the claim of a racial minority
subject to prejudice and unable to alter the adverse outcome of the
political process. More than that, the Warren Court felt a heightened
responsibility' 69 to exercise independent judgment when the political
processes themselves were too clogged, impure, corrupted, undemocratic, or antimajoritarian170 to achieve "good" results. Such judgment
involved not merely a judicial corrective for the "wrong" outcome of
the political processes, as in the desegregation cases, but stronger, surer
medicine: judicial reform of the political system itself. The result
should be, as Chief Justice Warren announced upon his retirement, that
"most of these problems that we are now confronted with would be
solved through the political process rather than through the courts.' 7 '
Chief Justice Warren considered the reapportionment decisions,
embodying the one man, one vote doctrine, his most important achievement. 72 If congressional inaction induced the Warren Court to fashion a judicial remedy for the grievance of a racial minority in Brown,
then congressional failure to reapportion itself equitably and to force
equitable reapportionment on the state legislatures seems even more
likely to have impelled judicial reform of the political processes. As
73
Justice Clark indicated in his concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr,
in which the Court entertained jurisdiction over alleged malapportionment of state legislatures under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "I would not consider intervention by this
Court into so delicate a field if there were any other relief available
to the people of Tennessee."' 4 Challenging dissenting Justice Frankfurter's faith in the ballot box, Justice Clark asserted that "the majority of the people of Tennessee have no 'practical opportunities for ex168. By 1954 seventeen states and the District of Columbia required segregation in
the public schools and four states permitted segregation at the option of local school
districts. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
169. Mason, JudicialActivism, supra note 113, at 392.
170. These terms have been used by various writers to describe, however imprecisely, the nature of the political process the Warren Court tried to reform. See, e.g., Cox,
THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 22; A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PRoGREss 32 (1970).
171. N.Y.Times, June 27, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
172. See note 141 supra.
173. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
174. Id. at 258.
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erting their political weight at the polls' -175 to correct the existing malapportionment. While conceding that perhaps there may be recourse
in Congress, Justice Clark dismissed that remedy as lacking substance.
"To date," he concluded, "Congress has never undertaken such a task
in any State." 176
Justice Harlan, dissenting, attributed Clark's rationale to the entire
majority in Baker. From a reading of the majority and concurring
opinions, Justice Harlan thought, one would not find it difficult to
catch the premises that underlay the decision. The fact that the appellants had been unable to obtain political redress of their asserted grievances appeared to lead the Court to stretch to find some basis for
7
judicial intervention." 7 In Wesberry v. Sanders,1
in which the Court
applied the one man, one vote doctrine to the House of Representatives,
Justice Harlan again dissented, repeating the charge: "The unstated
premise of the Court's conclusion quite obviously is that the Congress
has not dealt, and the Court believes it will not deal, with the problem
of congressional apportionment in accordance with what the Court
believes to be sound political principles." 79
The unstated premise was unmistakably confirmed by Chief Justice Warren himself, speaking for the Court, except Justice Harlan, in
Reynolds v. Sims, 80 in which the one man, one vote doctrine was extended to both houses of all state legislatures. No effective political
remedy to obtain relief against the alleged malapportionment, Chief
Justice Warren observed, appears to have been available.' 81 Legislative
inaction, coupled with the unavailability of any political or judicial
remedy, had yielded a perpetual scheme of malapportionment that the
chief justice called "little more than an irrational anachronism."' 82 In
short, the political processes having failed to purify themselves, the
Warren Court would intervene.
One man, one vote became the judicial remedy for malapportioned state legislatures and the House of Representatives. Voting
equality thus joined racial equality as a major goal of the Warren Court.
Unlike the Court's approach in Brown, however, in which the chief jus175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 339.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 42.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 553.
Id. at 570.
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tice's opinion eschewed history in favor of updating the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Wesberry, consistent with his approval of the result in Brown, relied solely on history.
He announced: "We hold that, construed in its historical context, the
command of Art. 1, § 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the
People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. '"183 The debates at the Convention, Black explained, proved
that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent the
"people" they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each state should be determined solely by the number of the
state's inhabitants.18 4 History makes that fact abundantly clear, but
certainly not the conclusion to which Justice Black jumped:
It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great
Compromise-equal representation in the House for equal numbers
of people-for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may
draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give
some voters
a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than
85
others.'
87
As Justice Harlan's dissent" 6 and the work of other scholars
have effectively demonstrated, history weighed more heavily against
the Court's result in Wesberry than it did in Brown. History was
merely inconclusive in Brown; but in Wesberry the record of the past
was contrary to the Court's conclusion, and as a result the Court rejected that approach and simply "mangled constitutional history," as
Alfred H. Kelly has put it.'
Neither history nor the "reasonable doubt" test, however, deterred
the Court in Reynolds. The Brown approach prevailed; indeed, Chief
Justice Warren explicitly invoked Brown as controlling precedent.' 8 9
Moreover, the chief justice implicitly invoked the heart of the political
183. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 14.
186. Even Justice Clark in his opinion in Wesberry agreed that Justice Harlan
"clearly demonstrated that both the historical background and language preclude a
finding that Art. 1, § 2, lays down the ipse dixit 'one person, one vote' in congressional elections." Id. at 18 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv.
119 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kelly]; McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment
Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962); R. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND PoLmcs (1968); M. SHAPiRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN TiE
SuPREME COURT: NEW APPROAcHES To PoLmcAL JUISPRUDENCE (1964).
188. Kelly, supra note 187, at 135.
189. 377 U.S. at 566.
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'process argument in footnote four of Carolene Products. Especially
because the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, Chief
Justice Warren reasoned, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 100 Careful
scrutiny of alleged malapportionment yielded preferred constitutional
After
status for the democratic ideals of equality and majority rule.'
all, history had witnessed a continuing expansion of the right of suffrage
in this country, the chief justice noted, citing the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Amendments as
well as the congressional civil rights legislation of 1957 and 1960.102
Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter in Reynolds, did1 93not overlook the
Court's reliance on non-judicial constitutional change.:
If constitutional amendment was the only means by which all men
and, later, women, could be guaranteed the right to vote at all, even
for federal officers, how can it be that the far less obvious right
to a particular kind of apportionment of state legislatures

. . .

can

be conferred by judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment?' 04
Justice Harlan's question answers itself: the Warren Court felt free,
perhaps obliged, to exercise independent judgment in the service of preferred freedoms, in this case "the fundamental principle of . . . equal

representation for equal numbers of people."' 195 Imposing its own
view of how democratic the political process should be, the Court,
through its chief justice, declared that the right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is the essence of a democratic society, and
any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. The Court was committed to a particular political philosophy, what Justice Harlan called "a piece of political ideology."10 Chief
Justice Warren reasoned:
[I]n a society ostensibly grounded on representative government,
it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State
could elect a majority of that State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of state legislative bodies,
would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far surpasses
190. Id. at 562.
191. Id. at 566.
192. Id. at 555 n.28.
193. Chief Justice Warren also relied on documents having no constitutional relevance-the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Id. at 558,
568.
194. Id. at 612.
195. Id. at 560-61.
196. Id. at 590.
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any possible denial
of minority rights that might otherwise be
9
thought to result.1 T
The fact that less than majoritarian systems of representation might also
seem reasonable, for which Justice Harlan in Baker' 98 found proof in
the existence of the United States Senate, was not relevant, much less
controlling, in the Court's independent judgment. The Court concluded that our constitutional system amply provides for the protection
of minorities by means other than giving them majority control of state
legislatures. 199
The Warren Court's creative approach to constitutional adjudication, begun in Brown and extended in the reapportionment decisions,
suffered a temporary setback two years after Reynolds when, in Fortson
v. Morris,200 a sharply divided Court upheld Georgia's system of having
the state legislature select a governor from the two persons receiving the
highest number of votes in a general election in which no candidate obtained a majority. Justice Black's majority opinion relied on history:
the Georgia plan, "as old as the Nation itself," '0 1 did not violate the equal
protection clause. Eschewing judicial updating of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Black's opinion, consistent with his approval of
Brown, his dissents in Bell and Harper, and his approach in Wesberry,
drew the wrath of the four dissenters. Justice Douglas, joined by the
chief justice and Justices Brennan and Fortas, found the Georgia plan
antimajoritarian and contrary to the one man, one vote principle. Justice Fortas, joined by the chief justice and Justice Douglas, objected
even more strongly. The Warren Court's understanding and conception of the rights guaranteed to the people by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Fortas declared, "have deepened, and have resulted in a series of decisions, enriching the quality of our democracy
.. 22 Baker, Gray v. Sanders,20a Wesberry, Reynolds, and
Harper20 4 had "reinvigorated our national political life at its roots so
that it may continue its growth to realization of the full stature of our
constitutional ideal. '20 5 The Fortson decision, Justice Fortas la197.
198.
372 U.S.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 565.
369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
368, 387-88 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
377 U.S. at 566.
385 U.S. 231 (1966).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 247.
372 U.S. 368 (1962).
385 U.S. at 247 n.4.
Id. at 249.

See also Gray v. Sanders,
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mented, was a startling reversal of the Warren Court's record.200 By
relying on history the Court had departed from the method used in
Reynolds; history, Justice Fortas urged, was as irrelevant here as it had
been in Reynolds. Citing Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds,2 °7 Justice Fortas noted that in the early days of the nation many of the state
legislatures were malapportioned. "Certainly," he emphasized, "the
antiquity of the practice did not cause this Court to refrain from invalidating malapportionment under the Equal Protection Clause. 21 0 8 In
short, the Court had failed in its duty to update the Fourteenth Amendment in the service of majoritarian democracy.
This political process argument reached full bloom under the
Warren Court in Kramer v. Union School District.' 9 Without explicitly acknowledging footnote four of Carolene Products, the Court,
through Chief Justice Warren, clearly relied on its rationale and even
its language to strike down, under the equal protection clause, a section
of the New York Education Law that provided that in certain New
York school districts residents who are otherwise eligible to vote in
state and federal elections may vote in school district elections only if
they own or lease taxable real property within the district or are parents
or guardians of children enrolled in the local public schools. Referring
six times to the need for more exacting judicial scrutiny of legislation
impairing the purity of the political process,2 10 the Court flatly rejected
the reasonable doubt test as well as the traditional presumption of constitutionality. In a characteristic display of candor, Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for a majority of six, built on paragraphs two and
three of footnote four:
[W]hen we are reviewing statutes which deny some residents the
right to vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded
state statutes and the traditional approval given state classifications
if the Court can conceive of a "rational basis" for the distinctions
made are not applicable. . . . The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" classifications in other types
of enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of
state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect
a challenge to this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer
serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality. And, the assumption is no less under attack because the legislature which de206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
377 U.S. at 602-07.
385 U.S. at 247-48.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Id. at 626, 627, 628, 629, 633.
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cides who may participate at the various levels of political choice
is fairly elected. Legislation which delegates decision making to
bodies elected by only a portion of those2 1eligible to vote for the
legislature can cause unfair representation. 1
The Court exercised more exacting judicial scrutiny because the New
York statute selectively distributed the franchise in school district elections. The chief justice's opinion held that the classification did not
distinguish voters primarily interested in school affairs with sufficient
precision to justify denying a voice to Kramer, a non-taxpaying bachelor 12 Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Justices Black and Harlan,
and insisted that the classification was clearly related to a legitimate
legislative purpose. New York had rationally concluded that local educational policy was best left to those persons who had direct and definable interests in that policy, either because they carried the local financial burden or because they were parents of school children. That
Kramer might personally be as interested in the conduct of a school
district's business as a local taxpayer or parent was no more relevant,
the dissenters thought, than the fact that commuters from New Jersey
might be as genuinely interested in the outcome of a New York City
election as New Yorkers. After all, Stewart wrote, "such discrepancies
are the inevitable concomitant of the line drawing that is essential to
213
law making.
C.

Criminal Justice

More exacting judicial scrutiny, involving the repudiation of historical intent, the reasonable doubt test, and even the presumption of
constitutionality, meant also independent judicial judgment in the service of preferred freedoms-equality in the political process, among
the races, and, third on Chief Justice Warren's list of major contributions by his Court, 214 in the administration of criminal justice. Gideon
v. Wainwright,'15 establishing the right to counsel in state courts for
indigent defendants accused of serious crimes, took its proper place on
the chief justice's roll of honor. Decided in 1963 by a unanimous
Court, Gideon can be viewed as consistent with the Court's traditional
approach to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
211. Id.at627-28.
212. Id. at 632.
213. Id. at 637.
214. See note 141 supra.

215. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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espoused by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut.2 16 There the
Court expressly affirmed and applied the reasonable doubt test as controlling judicial determination of which Bill of Rights freedoms the due
process clause incorporated and to what extent it did so. Construing
due process in Palko as protecting only those liberties that have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' 1 the Court excluded certain Bill of Rights freedoms precisely because their necessary
connection to the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty could
not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Rights to trial by jury
and indictment by grand jury were thus rejected; so too was the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination. In like fashion Justice
Cardozo reasoned that the particular kind of double jeopardy involved
in the Palko case did not clearly violate the due process clause.
Whether the Court in Gideon rejected the reasonable doubt test,
so prominent in Palko, is uncertain; surely the reasonable doubt test
would have yielded the same result.2 18 More certain, however, is that
in companion cases involving criminal procedure under the due process
clause, the Warren Court clearly abandoned the reasonable doubt test
in favor of the creative approach taken in the segregation and reapportionment decisions. Notable for their reliance on independent judicial
judgment in behalf of greater egalitarianism in the administration of
criminal justice219 are Miranda v. Arizona22 0 and Duncan v. Louisiana.221 Especially revealing are the opinions of Justice White, dissenting in Miranda and speaking for the Court in Duncan, for they confirm
the implications of independent judicial judgment.
Chief Justice Warren, writing in 1966 for the Miranda majority
of five, held that state courts could not admit as evidence statements
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant, unless the state
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. 2 2 In a strident dissent, joined by
216. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969)).
217. Id. at 325.
218. See, e.g., 372 U.S. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Israel, Gideon v.
Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, in THE SuPREmE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
263 (P. Kurland ed. 1960); A. LEwis,GMEON'S TnumPET 173-81 (1964).
219. See Cox, Tim WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 86. Cox agrees that egalitarianism is the common thread joining the leading decisions of the Warren Court in the
areas of race relations, reapportionment, and criminal procedure.
220. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
221. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
222. 384 U.S. at 444.

Fall 1976]

1009

THE "REASONABLE DOUBT" TEST

Justices Stewart and White, Justice Harlan faulted both the constitutional foundation and the desirability of the Court's ruling. "Nothing
in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents," he
insisted, "squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is
so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. 223 Viewed as a choice based on pure policy,
Justice Harlan thought these new rules were a debatable appraisal of
the competing interests at stake.224 In short, the dissenters accused
the Court of using independent judicial judgment to justify a result that
the reasonable doubt test would not-indeed, could not-yield.
In a separate dissent, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, Justice White approved the majority's creative approach but not the
result. Justice White candidly admitted that the Court does-and
should-make policy, presumably on the basis of its independent judgment and not the reasonable doubt test; he merely disagreed with the
wisdom of the Court's decision, apparently because it did not square
with his independent judgment. Justice White conceded that the
Court's holding was compelled neither by the language of the Fifth
Amendment nor by American and English legal history. Nevertheless,
he insisted that while the Court's approach did not prove either that
the Court had exceeded its powers or that it had acted unwisely in reinterpreting the Fifth Amendment, the decision did show that
the Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's
decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what
it has done is to make new law and new public policy in much the
same way that it has in the course of interpreting other great
clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically has
done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to do until
and unless there is some fundamental
225change in the constitutional
distribution of governmental powers.
Justice White implied that so long as the majority felt free to exercise
independent judgment to create new constitutional law, he was entitled
to the same privilege and was prepared to exercise it.
Accordingly, Justice White proceeded to exercise independent
judgment in Duncan v. Louisiana,26 this time for a majority, and he
thereby parted company with Justice Harlan. Holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is fundamental
to the American scheme of justice, the Court incorporated the federal
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 525-26. See also Cox, THE WARREN
384 U.S. at 505.
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).

COuRT, supra note

1, at 84.
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guarantee into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite the acknowledgment of important dicta in Palko (Cardozo's
"weighty and respectable" conclusion that the right to jury trial is not
clearly essential to ordered liberty22 7 ), despite the concession that jury
' ' 2 despite the
trial has "its weaknesses and the potential for misuse,
citation of professional criticism that raised serious questions about the
fundamental fairness of jury trial,22 9 and despite the explicit refusal to
assert "that every criminal trial-or any particular trial-held before
a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly
'230 the Court nevertheless
treated by a judge as he would be by a jury,
rejected the Palko approach in favor of independent judicial judgment.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Affirming
the Palko approach, they accused the majority of making no real an231 Exalysis of whether the jury trial is critical to procedural faimess.
amining the available evidence, the dissenters concluded that the virtues and defects of the jury system had been hotly debated for a long
time, and were hotly debated still, without significant change in the
lines of argument.2 32 Yet the Court had chosen, through its independent judgment, to impose upon every State one means of trying criminal
cases; it is a good means, the dissenters allowed, "but it is not the only
fair means, and it is233 not demonstratably better than the alternatives
States might devise.
Jury trial is surely no more-or less-essential to fundamental
fairness in criminal due process than the rules mandated in Miranda.
The implication, of course, is that independent judicial judgment, like
reasonable legislative judgment, can go either way. More importantly,
the exercise of independent judicial judgment, permitting the exercise
of judicial choice between constitutionally permissible alternative policies, calls into question the justification for judicial review. For if
judges will not or cannot be held to the rigors of the reasonable doubt
test to reduce judicial bias and policy-making, then Hamilton's warning,
written in a defense of judicial review, should be considered. If judges
"should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT," he
thought, "the consequence would. . . be the substitution of their plea227. Id. at 155.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 156, quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).
Id. at 156-57 & n.24.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 1986.
Id. at 193.
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sure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it prove anything, would prove that there ought to be no judges independent of
that body."23' 4 To the extent that what Hamilton called "will" may be
what Thayer called "independent judgment," the Warren Court, like
certain of its predecessors, stands indicted.
V.

Constitutional Change: Ends and Means

The reasonable doubt test has its limitations, as even Thayer acknowledged. Intended to narrow the scope of judicial judgment to
minimize erroneous judicial construction of the Constitution at the expense of reasonable legislative interpretation, it still requires judicial
discretion. Like any other guideline, it can be and has been misapplied, ignored, and otherwise abused. However, the reasonable doubt
test has often been correctly applied and remains a workable standard
in constitutional adjudication.
Alexander Bickel, like a growing number of constitutional scholars, insisted that it has not always been possible to be satisfied that what
is rational is constitutional, and that the "real question" may be whether
legislation is "good". The answer, he concluded, "may depend on the
assignment of preponderant weight to one or another value."2 35
Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell agree. They urge that the
search for true neutrality in constitutional adjudication is a bootless
quest, 236 that value choices are inevitable,23 7 and that therefore the
quest for impartiality in the judicial process should be jettisoned in
favor of a result-oriented jurisprudence, one purposeful in nature rather
than "impersonal" or "neutral. '23 8 Judicial decisions should be evaluated in terms of their social adequacy, and their realization or non-realization of stated societal values, -3
2
broadly defined by Miller and
Howell as "furthering the democratic ideal. 24 ° Even Herbert Wechsler, whose support of "neutral principles" 241 in constitutional adjudication had triggered the Miller and Howell thesis, later admitted that the
234. THE
235.
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application of neutral principles entailed judicial choice between competing values. 42
More recently, other students of constitutional law have reached
similar conclusions. Gerald Garvey has praised the Warren Court for
moving toward a jurisprudence of concepts tailored to the realities
rather than the shadows of American politics: "wisely and well," he
believes, the Court began "to move constitutional interpretation beyond
the Constitution."24 Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhous also
endorse the new political jurisprudence, which envisions judges operating. as social engineers, and they regret that "political scientists have
made remarkably few efforts to order coherently and then justify a
broad set of goals and values that society, and judges in particular,
should be fostering. 21 4 4 Ronald Dworkin concurs. He sharply rebukes lawyers, and by implication all students of public law, for failing
to fuse constitutional law and moral theory so that observers of the Supreme Court can better evaluate its decisions in terms of the "good"-the "just"-society, and so that the Court, in fashioning wise public policy, can have resort to better moral justifications. The academic debate, Dworkin charges, "has so far failed to produce an adequate account of where error lies" because the fusion of constitutional law and
moral theory he advocates has yet to take place. But, Dworkin cautiously concludes, "better philosophy is now available." 2 5
This developing call for social scientists to help equip the Court
to rise above the Constitution, to make "good" public law based on
compelling moral theory, raises disturbing problems. "There is, of
course," Dworkin himself admits, "a very lively dispute in moral philosophy about the nature and standing of moral rights, and considerable
disagreement about what they are, if they are anything at all. 21 46
Dworkin also concedes that a theory of political skepticism would justify
a scope for judicial judgment much narrower than he and others advocate, for individuals "have only such legal rights as the Constitution
grants them, and these are limited to the plain and uncontroversial violations of public morality that the framers had actually in mind. 24 7
242. H. WECHSLER,

PRINCIPLES,

POLmCS AND FUNIAMENTA.L

(1961). Wechsler's original poisition appears to be identical.
Principles,supra note 241, at 15, 20.
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Dworkin insists that once one grants the existence of moral rights
against the state beyond those constitutionally protected, then the reasonable doubt test is an inadequate standard of judicial review. While
accepting the impartiality argument as the strongest justification for judicial review,248 he asserts that the impartiality argument requires that
judges be free to exercise a reviewing power broader than the reasonable doubt test, in effect, an independent judgment, in pursuit of the
correct moral principles to be incorporated into the Constitution.
Even granting Dworkin's highly dubious assumption that correct
moral principles are discoverable, his position is shaky. He admits that
those principles have not yet been discovered. That being the case,
has not the Court, following Dworkin's own reasoning, been on occasion excessively premature in updating and rewriting the Constitution?
Should the Court not have awaited more certain discovery of correct
moral principles instead of attempting to foist upon America society
values that are, by Dworkin's admission, still uncertified as "morally"
good? After all, do we really want the Supreme Court, as Charles P.
Curtis once asked, to be the prophet of our natural law?2 49
At bottom, the issue addressed is how constitutional change should
occur. The Constitution, of course, clearly provides its own amendment procedure, which, if deemed too difficult, could be formally revised to provide for an easier procedure. Why, then, should the Court
act as a continuing constitutional convention? The notion that the Court
must be the voice of a "living constitution," so as better to safeguard
liberties thought by some to be incompletely preserved by the Constitution, not only runs into the problem that correct moral principles have
not yet been discovered, it also permits judicial disregard for constitutional liberties. If the Court, even circumscribed by the reasonable
doubt test, has often erred, how much more potential for judicial error
exists without that limitation on the scope of judicial judgment?
Like Miller and Howell, like Murphy and Garvey, and like others
who urge judicial updating of the Constitution in accordance with correct moral theory, Dworkin advances a position thoroughly at odds with
both the impartiality argument for judicial review and the reasonable
doubt test. His position admittedly depends on the ability of judges,
aided by social scientists, to discover correct moral principles and probably depends on another premise whose truth is not self-evident: that
248. Id. at 31-32.
249. C. CURTIS, LAW AS LARGE AS LIFE: A NATURAL LAw FOR TODAY AND THE
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a constitution should require most, if not all, that is "good" and should
prohibit most, if not all, that is "bad." Even granting both assumptions,
I would urge that fundamentally correct moral principles, when discovered, find their way into the Constitution through article V. Like
Curtis, I would leave "our natural law to take its chances without a na25
tional prophet. 1

250. Id. at 103.

